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INTERDISTRICT SCHOOL CHOICE: A THEORY OF STUDENT ASSIGNMENT†
ISA E. HAFALIR, FUHITO KOJIMA, AND M. BUMIN YENMEZ∗
Abstract. Interdistrict school choice programs—where a student can be assigned to a
school outside of her district—are widespread in the US, yet the market-design literature
has not considered such programs. We introduce a model of interdistrict school choice and
present two mechanisms that produce stable or efficient assignments. We consider three cate-
gories of policy goals on assignments and identify when the mechanisms can achieve them.
By introducing a novel framework of interdistrict school choice, we provide a new avenue
of research in market design.
1. Introduction
School choice is a program that uses preferences of children and their parents over pub-
lic schools to assign children to schools. It has expanded rapidly in the United States and
many other countries in the last few decades. Growing popularity and interest in school
choice stimulated research in market design, which has not only studied this problem in
the abstract, but also contributed to designing specific assignment mechanisms.1
Existing market-design research about school choice is, however, limited to intradistrict
choice, where each student is assigned to a school only in her own district. In other words,
the literature has not studied interdistrict choice, where a student can be assigned to a
school outside of her district. This is a severe limitation for at least two reasons. First,
interdistrict school choice is widespread: some form of it is practiced in 43 U.S. states.2
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2 HAFALIR, KOJIMA, AND YENMEZ
Second, as we illustrate in detail below, many policy goals in school choice impose con-
straints across districts in reality, but the existing literature assumes away such constraints.
This omission limits our ability to analyze these policies of interest.
In this paper, we propose a model of interdistrict school choice. Our paper builds upon
matching models in the tradition of Gale and Shapley (1962).3 We study mechanisms and
interdistrict admissions rules to assign students to schools under which a variety of policy
goals can be established, an approach similar to the intradistrict school choice literature
(Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003). In our setting, however, policy goals are defined on
the district level—or sometimes even over multiple districts—rather than the individual
school level, placing our model outside of the standard setting. To facilitate the analysis
in this setting, we model the problem as matching with contracts (Hatfield and Milgrom,
2005) between students and districts in which a contract specifies the particular school
within the district that the student attends.4
Following the school choice literature, we begin our analysis by considering stability
(we also consider efficiency, as explained later). To define stability in our framework, we
assume that each district is endowed with an admissions rule represented by a choice
function over sets of contracts. We focus our attention on the student-proposing deferred-
acceptance mechanism (SPDA) of Gale and Shapley (1962). In our setting, this mechanism
is not only stable but also strategy-proof—i.e., it renders truthtelling a weakly dominant
strategy for each student.
In this context, we formalize a number of important policy goals. The first is individual
rationality in the sense that every student is matched with a weakly more preferred school
than the school she is initially matched with (in the absence of interdistrict school choice).
This is an important requirement, because if an interdistrict school choice program harms
students, then public opposition is expected and the program may not be sustainable.
The second policy is what we call the balanced-exchange policy: The number of students that
each district receives from the other districts must be the same as the number of students
that it sends to the others. Balanced exchange is also highly desired by school districts in
practice. This is because each district’s funding depends on the number of students that it
serves and, therefore, if the balanced-exchange policy is not satisfied, then some districts
may lose funding, possibly making the interdistrict school choice program impossible. For
each of these policy goals, we identify the necessary and sufficient condition for achieving
that goal under SPDA as a restriction on district admissions rules.
3We use the terms assignment and matching interchangeably for the rest of the paper.
4One might suspect that an interdistrict school choice problem can readily be reduced to an intradistrict
problem by relabeling a district as a school. This is not the case because, among other things, which school
within a district a student is matched with matters for that student’s welfare.
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Last, but not least, we also consider a requirement that there be enough student diversity
in each district. In fact, diversity appears to be the main motivation for many interdistrict
school choice programs.5 To put this into context, we note that the lack of diversity is
prevalent under intradistrict school choice programs even though they often seek diversity
by controlled-choice constraints.6 This is perhaps unsurprising given that only residents
of the given district can participate in intradistrict school choice and there is often severe
residential segregation. In fact, a number of studies such as Rivkin (1994) and Clotfelter
(1999, 2011) attribute the majority—as high as 80 percent for some data and measure—
of racial and ethnic segregation in public schools to disparities between school districts
rather than within school districts. Given this concern, many interdistrict choice programs
explicitly list achieving diversity as their main goal.
A case in point is the Achievement and Integration (AI) Program of the Minnesota Depart-
ment of Education (MDE). Introduced in 2013, the AI program incentivizes school dis-
tricts for integration. A district is required to participate in this program if the proportion
of a racial group in the district is considerably higher than that in a neighboring district.
In particular, every year the MDE commissioner analyzes fall enrollment data from every
district and, when a district and one of its adjoining districts have a difference of 20 percent
or higher in the proportion of any group of enrolled protected students (American Indian,
Asian or Pacific Islander, Hispanic, Black, not of Hispanic origin, and White, not of His-
panic origin), the district with the higher percentage is required to be in the AI program.7
In the 2015-16 school year, more than 120 school districts participated in this program
(Figure 1, taken from MDE’s website, shows school districts in the Minneapolis-Saint Paul
metro area that take part in this program).
Motivated by Minnesota’s AI program, we consider a policy goal requiring that the
difference in the proportions of each student type across districts be within a given bound.
Then, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for SPDA to satisfy the diversity
policy. The condition provided is one on district admissions rules that have a structure of
type-specific ceilings, an analogue of the class of choice rules analyzed by Abdulkadirog˘lu
and So¨nmez (2003) and Ehlers et al. (2014) in the context of a more standard intradistrict
school-choice problem.
5We refer to Wells et al. (2009) for a review and discussion of interdistrict integration programs.
6Examples of controlled school choice include Boston before 1999, Cambridge, Columbus, and Min-
neapolis. See Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003) for details of these programs as well as analysis of con-
trolled school choice.
7In Minnesota’s AI program, if the difference in the proportion of protected students at a school is 20
percent or higher than a school in the same district, the school with the higher percentage is considered
a racially identifiable school (RIS) and districts with RIS schools also need to participate in the AI program.
In this paper, we focus on diversity issues across districts rather than within districts. Diversity problems
within districts are studied in the controlled school choice literature that we discuss below.
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Figure 1. Minnesota-Saint Paul metro area school districts participating in
the AI program. The districts with the same color are adjoining districts that
exchange students with one another.
Next, we turn our attention to efficiency. Given that the distributional policy goals work
as constraints on matchings, we use the concept of constrained efficiency. We say that a
matching is constrained efficient if it satisfies the policy goal and is not Pareto dominated
by any matching that satisfies the same policy goal. In addition, we require individual
rationality and strategy-proofness.8 We first demonstrate an impossibility result; when the
diversity policy is given as type-specific ceilings at the district level, there is no mechanism
that satisfies the policy goal, constrained efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy-
proofness. By contrast, a version of the top trading cycles mechanism (TTC) of Shapley
and Scarf (1974) satisfies these properties when the policy goal satisfies M-convexity, a
8Without individual rationality, all the other desired properties can be attained by a serial dictatorship.
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concept in discrete mathematics (Murota, 2003). We proceed to show that the balanced-
exchange policy and an alternative form of diversity policy—type-specific ceilings at the
individual school level instead of at the district level—are M-convex, so TTC satisfies the
desired properties for these policies. The same conclusion holds even when both of these
policy goals are imposed simultaneously.
We also consider the case when there is a policy function that measures how well a
matching satisfies the policy goal. For example, diversity of a matching can be measured
as its distance to an ideal distribution of students. We show that TTC satisfies the same
desirable properties when the policy function satisfies pseudo M-concavity, a notion of con-
cavity for discrete functions that we introduce. Furthermore, we show that there is an
equivalence between two approaches based on the M-convexity of the policy set and the
pseudo M-concavity of the policy function. Therefore, both results can naturally be ap-
plied in different settings depending on how the policy goals are stated.
Related Literature. Our paper is closely related to the controlled school choice literature
that studies student diversity in schools in a given district. Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez
(2003) introduce a policy that imposes type-specific ceilings on each school. This policy
has been analyzed by Abdulkadirog˘lu (2005), Ergin and So¨nmez (2006), and Kojima (2012),
among others. More accommodating policies using reserves rather than type-specific ceil-
ings have been proposed and analyzed by Hafalir et al. (2013) and Ehlers et al. (2014). The
latter paper finds difficulties associated with hard floor constraints, an issue further an-
alyzed by Fragiadakis et al. (2015) and Fragiadakis and Troyan (2017).9 In addition to
sharing the motivation of achieving diversity, our paper is related to this literature in that
we extend the type-specific reserve and ceiling constraints to district admissions rules. In
contrast to this literature, however, our policy goals are imposed on districts rather than
individual schools, which makes our model and analysis different from the existing ones.
The feature of our paper that imposes constraints on sets of schools (i.e., districts),
rather than individual schools, is shared by several recent studies in matching with con-
straints. Kamada and Kojima (2015) study a model where the number of doctors who can
be matched with hospitals in each region has an upper bound constraint. Variations and
generalizations of this problem are studied by Goto et al. (2014, 2017), Biro et al. (2010),
and Kamada and Kojima (2017, 2018), among others. While sharing the broad interest in
constraints, these papers are different from ours in at least two major respects. First, they
do not assume a set of hospitals is endowed with a well-defined choice function, while
each school district has a choice function in our model. Second, the policy issues studied
9In addition to the works discussed above, recent studies on controlled school choice and other two-
sided matching problems with diversity concerns include Westkamp (2013), Echenique and Yenmez (2015),
So¨nmez (2013), Kominers and So¨nmez (2016), Dur et al. (2014), Dur et al. (2016), and Nguyen and Vohra
(2017).
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in these papers and those studied in ours are different given differences in the intended
applications. These differences render our analysis distinct from those of the other papers,
with none of their results implying ours and vice versa.
One of the notable features of our model is that district admissions rules do not nec-
essarily satisfy the standard assumptions in the literature, such as substitutability, which
guarantee the existence of a stable matching. In fact, even a seemingly reasonable district
admissions rule may violate substitutability because a district can choose at most one con-
tract associated with the same student—namely just one contract representing one school
that the student can attend. Rather, we make weaker assumptions following the approach
of Hatfield and Kominers (2014). This issue is playing an increasingly prominent role in
matching with contracts literature; for example, in matching with constraints (Kamada
and Kojima, 2015), college admissions (Aygu¨n and Turhan, 2016; Yenmez, 2018), and post-
graduate admissions (Hassidim et al., 2017), to name just a few.
Our analysis of Pareto efficient mechanisms is related to a small but rapidly growing
literature that uses discrete optimization techniques for matching problems. Closest to
ours is Suzuki et al. (2017), who show that a version of TTC satisfies desirable properties
if the constraint satisfies M-convexity.10 Our analysis on efficiency builds upon and gen-
eralizes theirs. While the use of discrete convexity concepts for studying efficient object
allocation is still rare, it has been utilized in an increasing number of matching problems
such as two-sided matching with possibly bounded transfer (Fujishige and Tamura, 2006,
2007), matching with substitutable choice functions (Murota and Yokoi, 2015), matching
with constraints (Kojima et al., 2018a), and trading networks (Candogan et al., 2016).
There is also a recent literature on segmented matching markets in a given district. Man-
junath and Turhan (2016) study a setting where different clearinghouses can be coordi-
nated, but not integrated in a centralized clearinghouse, and show how a stable matching
can be achieved. In a similar setting, Dur and Kesten (2018) study sequential mechanisms
and show that these mechanisms lack desired properties. In another work, Ekmekci and
Yenmez (2014) study the incentives of a school to join a centralized clearinghouse. In con-
trast to these papers, we study which interdistrict school choice policies can be achieved
when districts are integrated.
At a high level, the present paper is part of research in resource allocation under con-
straints. Real-life auction problems often feature constraints (Milgrom, 2009), and a great
deal of attention was paid to cope with complex constraints in a recent FCC auction for
spectrum allocation (Milgrom and Segal, 2014). Auction and exchange markets under
constraints are analyzed by Bing et al. (2004), Gul et al. (2018), and Kojima et al. (2018b).
Handling constraints is also a subject of a series of papers on probabilistic assignment
10See Kurata et al. (2016) for an earlier work on TTC in a more specialized setting involving floor con-
straints at individual schools.
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mechanisms (Budish et al., 2013; Che et al., 2013; Pycia and U¨nver, 2015; Akbarpour and
Nikzad, 2017; Nguyen et al., 2016). Closer to ours are Dur and U¨nver (2018) and Dur et
al. (2015). They consider the balance of incoming and outgoing members—a requirement
that we also analyze—while modeling exchanges of members of different institutions un-
der constraints. Although the differences in the model primitives and exact constraints
make it impossible to directly compare their studies with ours, these papers and ours
clearly share broad interests in designing mechanisms under constraints.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. In Sections
3 and 4, we study when the policy goals can be satisfied together with stability and con-
strained efficiency, respectively. Section 5 concludes. Additional results, examples, and
omitted proofs are presented in the Appendix.
2. Model
In this section, we introduce our concepts and notation.
2.1. Preliminary Definitions. There exist finite sets of students S, districtsD, and schools
C. Each student s and school c has a home district denoted by d(s) and d(c), respectively.
Each student s has a type τ(s) that can represent different aspects of the student such as
the gender, race, socioeconomic status, etc. The set of all types is finite and denoted by T .
Each school c has a capacity qc, which is the maximum number of students that the school
can enroll. There exist at least two school districts with one or more schools. For each
district d, kd is the number of students whose home district is d. In each district, schools
have sufficiently large capacities to accommodate all students from the district, i.e., for
every district d, kd ≤
∑
c:d(c)=d qc. For each type t, kt is the number of type-t students.
We model interdistrict school choice as a matching problem between students and dis-
tricts. However, merely identifying the district with which a student is matched leaves
the specific school she is enrolled in unspecified. To specify which school within a dis-
trict the student is matched with, we use the notion of contracts: A contract x = (s, d, c)
specifies a student s, a district d, and a school c within this district, i.e., d(c) = d.11 For any
contract x, let s(x), d(x), and c(x) denote the student, district, and school associated with
this contract, respectively. Let X ≡ {(s, d, c)|d(c) = d} denote the set of all contracts. For
any set of contracts X , let Xs denote the set of all contracts in X associated with student
s, i.e., Xs = {x ∈ X|s(x) = s}. Similarly, let Xd and Xc denote the sets of all contracts in X
associated with district d and school c, respectively.
11For ease of exposition, a contract will sometimes be denoted by a pair (s, c) with the understanding
that the district associated with the contract is the home district of school c.
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Each district d has an admissions rule that is represented by a choice function Chd.
Given a set of contracts X , the district chooses a subset of contracts associated with itself,
i.e., Chd(X) = Chd(Xd) ⊆ Xd.
Each student s has a strict preference order Ps over all schools and the outside option
of being unmatched, which is denoted by ∅. Likewise, Ps is also used to rank contracts
associated with s. Furthermore, we assume that the outside option is the least preferred
outcome, so for every contract x associated with s, x Ps ∅. The corresponding weak order
is denoted by Rs. More precisely, for any two contracts x, y associated with s, x Rs y if
x Ps y or x = y.
A matching is a set of contracts. A matching X is feasible for students if there exists
at most one contract associated with every student in X . A matching X is feasible if it
is feasible for students and the number of contracts associated with every school in X is
at most its capacity, i.e., for any c ∈ C, |Xc| ≤ qc. We assume that there exists a feasible
initial matching X˜ such that every student has exactly one contract.12 For any student s,
if X˜s = {(s, d, c)} for some district d and school c, then c is called the initial school of s.
A problem is a tuple (S,D, C, T , {d(s), τ(s), Ps}s∈S , {Chd}d∈D, {d(c), qc}c∈C, X˜). In what
follows, we assume that all the components of a problem are publicly known except for
student preferences. Therefore, we sometimes refer to a problem by the student preference
profile which we denote as PS . The preference profile of a subset of students S ⊆ S is
denoted by PS .
2.2. Properties of Admissions Rules. A district admissions rule Chd is feasible if it al-
ways chooses a feasible matching. It is acceptant if, for any contract x associated with
district d and matching X that is feasible for students; and if x is rejected from X , then at
Chd(X), either
• the number of students assigned to school c(x) is equal to qc(x), or
• the number of students assigned to district d is at least kd.
In words, when a district admissions rule is acceptant, a contract x = (s, d, c) can be
rejected by district d from a set which is feasible for students only if either the capacity of
school c is filled or district d has accepted at least kd students. Equivalently, if neither of
these two conditions is satisfied, then the district has to accept the student. Throughout
the paper, we assume that admissions rules are feasible and acceptant.13
A district admissions rule satisfies substitutability if, whenever a contract is chosen
from a set, it is also chosen from any subset containing that contract (Kelso and Crawford,
12In Appendix A.1, we also consider the case when the initial matching for each district is constructed
using student preferences and district admissions rules.
13In Section 3.3, we assume a weaker notion of acceptance when the admissions rule limits the number
of students of each type that the district can accept.
INTERDISTRICT SCHOOL CHOICE 9
1982; Roth, 1984). More formally, a district admissions ruleChd satisfies substitutability if,
for every x ∈ X ⊆ Y ⊆ X with x ∈ Chd(Y ), it must be that x ∈ Chd(X). A district admis-
sions rule satisfies the law of aggregate demand (LAD) if the number of contracts chosen
from a set is weakly greater than that of any of its subsets (Hatfield and Milgrom, 2005).
Mathematically, a district admissions rule Chd satisfies LAD if, for every X ⊆ Y ⊆ X ,
|Chd(X)| ≤ |Chd(Y )|.14 A completion of a district admissions rule Chd is another admis-
sions rule Ch′d such that for every matching X either Ch′d(X) is equal to Chd(X) or it is
not feasible for students (Hatfield and Kominers, 2014). Throughout the paper, we assume
that district admissions rules have completions that satisfy substitutability and LAD.15 In
Appendix B, we provide classes of district admissions rules that satisfy our assumptions.
2.3. Matching Properties, Policy Goals, and Mechanisms. A feasible matching X satis-
fies individual rationality if every student weakly prefers her outcome in X to her initial
school, i.e., for every student s, Xs Rs X˜s.
A distribution ξ ∈ Z|C|×|T |+ is a vector such that the entry for school c and type t is
denoted by ξtc. The entry ξtc is interpreted as the number of type-t students in school c at
ξ. Furthermore, let ξtd ≡
∑
c:d(c)=d ξ
t
c, which is interpreted as the number of type-t students
in district d at ξ. Likewise, for any feasible matching X , the distribution associated with
X is ξ(X) whose c, t entry ξtc(X) is the number of type-t students assigned to school c at
X . Similarly, ξtd(X) denotes the number of type-t students assigned to district d at X .
We represent a distributional policy goal Ξ as a set of distributions. The policy that
each student is matched without assigning any school more students than its capacity
is denoted by Ξ0, i.e., Ξ0 ≡ {ξ|∑c,t ξtc = ∑d kd and qc ≥ ∑t ξtc for all c}. A matching X
satisfies the policy goal Ξ if the distribution associated with X is in Ξ.
A feasible matching X Pareto dominates another feasible matching Y if every student
weakly prefers her outcome in X to her outcome in Y and at least one student strictly
prefers the former to the latter. Given a distributional policy goal, a feasible matching
X that satisfies the policy goal satisfies constrained efficiency if there exists no feasible
matching that satisfies the policy goal and Pareto dominates X .
A matching X is stable if it is feasible and
• districts would choose all contracts assigned to them, i.e., Chd(X) = Xd for every
district d, and
• there exist no student s and no district d who would like to match with each other,
i.e., there exists no contract x = (s, d, c) /∈ X such that x Ps Xs and x ∈ Chd(X∪{x}).
14Alkan (2002) and Alkan and Gale (2003) introduce related monotonicity conditions.
15Hatfield and Kojima (2010) introduce other notions of weak substitutability.
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Stability was introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962) for the college admissions problem.
In the context of assigning students to public schools, it is viewed as a fairness notion
(Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003).
A mechanism φ takes a profile of student preferences as input and produces a feasi-
ble matching. The outcome for student s at the reported preference profile PS under
mechanism φ is denoted as φs(PS). A mechanism φ satisfies strategy-proofness if no stu-
dent can misreport her preferences and get a strictly more preferred contract. More for-
mally, for every student s and preference profile PS , there exists no preference P ′s such that
φs(P
′
s, PS\{s}) Ps φs(PS). For any property on matchings, a mechanism satisfies the prop-
erty if, for every preference profile, the matching produced by the mechanism satisfies the
property.
3. Achieving Policy Goals with Stable Outcomes
To achieve stable matchings with desirable properties, we use a generalization of the
deferred-acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley (1962).
Student-Proposing Deferred Acceptance Algorithm.
Step 1: Each student s proposes a contract (s, d, c) to district d where c is her most
preferred school. Let X1d denote the set of contracts proposed to district d. District
d tentatively accepts contracts in Chd(X1d) and permanently rejects the rest. If there
are no rejections, then stop and return ∪d∈DChd(X1d) as the outcome.
Step n (n > 1): Each student s whose contract was rejected in Step n − 1 proposes
a contract (s, d, c) to district d where c is her next preferred school. If there is no
such school, then the student does not make any proposals. Let Xnd denote the
union of the set of contracts that were tentatively accepted by district d in Step
n − 1 and the set of contracts that were proposed to district d in Step n. District d
tentatively accepts contracts in Chd(Xnd ) and permanently rejects the rest. If there
are no rejections, then stop and return ∪d∈DChd(Xnd ).
The student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism (SPDA) takes a profile of stu-
dent preferences as input and produces the outcome of this algorithm at the reported stu-
dent preference profile. When district admissions rules have completions that satisfy sub-
stitutability and LAD, SPDA is stable and strategy-proof (Hatfield and Kominers, 2014).
Therefore, when we analyze SPDA, we assume that students report their preferences truth-
fully.
We illustrate SPDA using the following example. We come back to this example later to
study the effects of interdistrict school choice.
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Example 1. Consider a problem with two school districts, d1 and d2. District d1 has school c1
with capacity one and school c2 with capacity two. District d2 has school c3 with capacity
two. There are four students: students s1 and s2 are from district d1, whereas students s3
and s4 are from district d2. The initial matching is {(s1, c1), (s2, c2), (s3, c3), (s4, c3)}.
Given any set of contacts, district d1 chooses students who have contracts with school
c1 first and then chooses from the remaining students who have contracts with school c2.
For school c1, the district prioritizes students in the order s3  s4  s1  s2 and chooses
one applicant if there is any. For school c2, the district prioritizes students according to
the order s1  s2  s3  s4 and chooses as many applicants as possible without going
over the school’s capacity while ignoring the contracts of the students who have already
been accepted at school c1. Likewise, district d2 prioritizes students according to the order
s3  s4  s1  s2 and chooses as many applicants as possible without going over the
capacity of school c3. These admissions rules are feasible and acceptant, and they have
completions that satisfy substitutability and LAD.16 In addition, student preferences are
given by the following table,
Ps1 Ps2 Ps3 Ps4
c1 c3 c1 c2
c2 c1 c2 c1
c3 c2 c3 c3
which means that, for instance, student s1 prefers c1 to c2 to c3.
In this problem, SPDA runs as follows. At the first step, student s1 proposes to dis-
trict d1 with contract (s1, c1), student s2 proposes to district d2 with contract (s2, c3), stu-
dent s3 proposes to district d1 with contract (s3, c1), and student s4 proposes to district d1
with contract (s4, c2). District d1 first considers contracts associated with school c1, (s1, c1)
and (s3, c1), and tentatively accepts (s3, c1) while rejecting (s1, c1) because student s3 has
a higher priority than student s1 at school c1. Then district d1 considers contracts of the
remaining students associated with school c2. In this case, there is only one such contract,
(s4, c2), which is tentatively accepted. District d2 considers contract (s2, c3) and tentatively
accepts it. The tentative matching is {(s2, c3), (s3, c1), (s4, c2)}. Since there is a rejection, the
algorithm proceeds to the next step.
At the second step, student s1 proposes to district d1 with contract (s1, c2). District d1 first
considers contract (s3, c1) and tentatively accepts it. Then district d1 considers contracts
(s1, c2) and (s4, c2) and tentatively accepts them both. District d2 does not have any new
16In Appendix B.1, we provide a general class of admissions rules, including this one as a special case.
We show that these admissions rules are feasible and acceptant, and they have completions that satisfy
substitutability and LAD.
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contracts, so tentatively accepts (s2, c3). Since there is no rejection, the algorithm stops.
The outcome of SPDA is {(s1, c2), (s2, c3), (s3, c1), (s4, c2)}. 
In the rest of this section, we formalize three policy goals and characterize conditions
under which SPDA satisfies them.
3.1. Individual Rationality. In our context, individual rationality requires that every stu-
dent is matched with a weakly more preferred school than her initial school. As a result,
SPDA does not necessarily satisfy individual rationality even though each student is either
unmatched or matched with a school that is more preferred than being unmatched.
If individual rationality is violated so that some students prefer their initial schools to
the outcome of SPDA, then there may be public opposition that harm interdistrict school
choice efforts. For this reason, individual rationality is a desirable property for policymak-
ers. The following condition proves to play a crucial role for achieving this property.
Definition 1. A district admissions rule Chd respects the initial matching if, for any student
s whose initial school c is in district d and matching X that is feasible for students, (s, d, c) ∈ X
implies (s, d, c) ∈ Chd(X).
When a district’s admissions rule respects the initial matching, it has to admit those
contracts associated with itself in which students apply to their initial schools from every
matching that is feasible for students. The following result shows that this is exactly the
condition for SPDA to satisfy individual rationality.
Theorem 1. SPDA satisfies individual rationality if, and only if, each district’s admissions rule
respects the initial matching.
The intuition for the “if” part of this theorem is simple. When district admissions rules
respect the initial matching, no student is matched with a school which is strictly less
preferred than her initial school under SPDA because she is guaranteed to be accepted by
that school if she applies to it. For the “only if” part of the theorem, we construct a specific
student preference profile such that SPDA assigns one student a strictly less preferred
school than her initial school whenever there exists one district with an admissions rule
that does not respect the initial matching.
In the next example, we illustrate SPDA with district admissions rules that respect the
initial matching.
Example 2. Consider the problem in Example 1. Recall that in this problem, the outcome
of SPDA is {(s1, c2), (s2, c3), (s3, c1), (s4, c2)}. This matching is not individually rational be-
cause student s1 prefers her initial school c1 to school c2 that she is matched with. This
observation is consistent with Theorem 1 because the admissions rule of district d1 does
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not respect the initial matching. In particular, Chd1({(s1, c1), (s3, c1)}) = {(s3, c1)}, so stu-
dent s1 is rejected from a matching that is feasible for students and includes the contract
with her initial school.
Now modify the priority ranking of district d1 at school c1 so that s1  s2  s3  s4
but, otherwise, keep the construction of the district admissions rules and student prefer-
ences the same as before. With this change, district admissions rules respect the initial
matching because each student is accepted when she applies to the district with her initial
school.17 In particular, the proposal of student s1 to district d1 with her initial school c1 is
always accepted. With this modification, it is easy to check that the outcome of SPDA is
{(s1, c1), (s2, c3), (s3, c2), (s4, c2)}. This matching satisfies individual rationality. 
In some school districts, each student gets a priority at her neighborhood school, as in
this example. In the absence of other types of priorities, neighborhood priority guarantees
that SPDA satisfies individual rationality.
3.2. Balanced Exchange. For interdistrict school choice, maintaining a balance of students
incoming from and outgoing to other districts is important. To formalize this idea, we say
that a mechanism satisfies the balanced-exchange policy if the number of students that a
district gets from the other districts and the number of students that the district sends to
the others are the same for every district and for every profile of student preferences. Since
district choice rules are acceptant and students prefer every school to the outside option
of being unmatched, every student is matched with a school under SPDA. Therefore, for
SPDA, this policy is equivalent to the requirement that the number of students assigned
to a district must be equal to the number of students from that district.
The balanced-exchange policy is important because the funding that a district gets de-
pends on the number of students it serves. Therefore, an interdistrict school choice pro-
gram may not be sustainable if SPDA does not satisfy the balanced-exchange policy. For
achieving this policy goal, the following condition on admissions rules proves important.
Definition 2. A matching X is rationed if, for every district d, it does not assign strictly more
students to the district than the number of students whose home district is d. A district admissions
rule is rationed if it chooses a rationed matching from any matching that is feasible for students.
When a district admissions rule is rationed, the district does not accept strictly more
students than the number of students from the district at any matching that is feasible
for students. The result below establishes that this property is exactly the condition to
guarantee that SPDA satisfies the balanced-exchange policy.
17In Appendix B.2, we construct a class of district admissions rules that includes this admissions rule as
a special case. These admissions rules are feasible and acceptant, and have completions that satisfy substi-
tutability and LAD. Furthermore, they also respect the initial matching.
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Theorem 2. SPDA satisfies the balanced-exchange policy if, and only if, each district’s admissions
rule is rationed.
To obtain the intuition for this result, consider a student. Acceptance requires that a
district can reject all contracts of this student only when the number of students assigned
to the district is at least as large as the number of students from that district. As a result,
all students are guaranteed to be matched. In addition, when district admissions rules
are rationed, a district cannot accept more students than the number of students from the
district. These two facts together imply that the number of students assigned to a district
in SPDA is equal to the number of students from that district. Therefore, SPDA satisfies
the balanced-exchange policy when each district’s admissions rule is rationed. Conversely,
when there exists one district with an admissions rule that fails to be rationed, then we can
construct student preferences such that this district is matched with strictly more students
than the number of students from the district in SPDA, which means that the outcome does
not satisfy the balanced-exchange policy.
Now we illustrate SPDA when district admissions rules are rationed.
Example 3. Consider the problem in Example 1. Recall that in this problem, the SPDA
outcome is {(s1, c2), (s2, c3), (s3, c1), (s4, c2)}. Since there are three students matched with
district d1 and there are only two students from that district, SPDA does not satisfy
the balanced-exchange policy. This is consistent with Theorem 2 because the admis-
sions rule of district d1 is not rationed. In particular, Chd1({(s1, c2), (s3, c1), (s4, c2)}) =
{(s1, c2), (s3, c1), (s4, c2)}, so district d1 accepts strictly more students than the number of
students from there given a matching that is feasible for students.
Suppose that we modify the admissions rule of district d1 as follows. If the dis-
trict chooses a contract associated with school c1, then at most one contract associated
with school c2 is chosen. Therefore, the district never chooses more than two con-
tracts, which is the number of students from there. Therefore, the updated admis-
sions rule is rationed.18 With this change, it is easy to check that the SPDA outcome is
{(s1, c2), (s2, c3), (s3, c1), (s4, c3)}, which satisfies the balanced-exchange policy. 
An implication of Theorems 1 and 2 is that SPDA is guaranteed to satisfy individual
rationality and the balanced-exchange policy if, and only if, each district’s admissions rule
respects the initial matching and is rationed.
3.3. Diversity. The third policy goal we consider is that of diversity. More specifically,
we are interested in how to ensure that there is enough diversity across districts so that
18In Appendix B.3, we construct a class of rationed district admissions rules that includes this admissions
rule as a special case. These admissions rules are feasible and acceptant, and they have completions that
satisfy substitutability and LAD.
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the student composition in terms of demographics does not vary too much from district
to district.
We are mainly motivated by a program that is used in the state of Minnesota. State law
in Minnesota identifies racially isolated (relative to one of their neighbors) school districts
and requires them to be in the Achievement and Integration (AI) Program. The goal is to in-
crease the racial parity between neighboring school districts. We first introduce a diversity
policy in the spirit of this program: Given a constant α ∈ [0, 1], we say that a mechanism
satisfies the α-diversity policy if for all preferences, districts d and d′, and type t, the dif-
ference between the ratios of type-t students in districts d and d′ is not more than α. We
interpret α to be the maximum ratio difference tolerated under the diversity policy; for
instance, α = 0.2 for Minnesota.
We study admissions rules such that SPDA satisfies the α-diversity policy when there
is interdistrict school choice. Since this policy restricts the number of students across dis-
tricts, a natural starting point is to have type-specific ceilings at the district level. However,
it turns out that type-specific ceilings at the district level may yield district admissions
rules resulting in no stable matchings (see Theorem 9 in Appendix A.2).
Since there is an incompatibility between district-level type-specific ceilings and the ex-
istence of a stable matching, we impose type-specific ceilings at the school level as follows.
Definition 3. A district admissions rule Chd has a school-level type-specific ceiling of qtc at
school c for type-t students if the number of type-t students admitted cannot exceed this ceiling.
More formally, for any matching X that is feasible for students,
|{x ∈ Chd(X)|τ(s(x)) = t, c (x) = c}| ≤ qtc.
Note that district admissions rules typically violate acceptance once school-level type-
specific ceilings are imposed. This is because a student can be rejected from a set that is
feasible for students even when the number of applicants to each school is smaller than its
capacity and the number of applicants to the district is smaller than the number of students
from that district. Given this, we define a weaker version of the acceptance assumption as
follows.
Definition 4. A district admissions ruleChd that has school-level type-specific ceilings is weakly
acceptant if, for any contract x associated with a type-t student and district d and matching X
that is feasible for students, if x is rejected from X , then at Chd(X),
• the number of students assigned to school c(x) is equal to qc(x), or
• the number of students assigned to district d is at least kd, or
• the number of type-t students assigned to school c(x) is at least qtc.
In other words, a student can be rejected from a set that is feasible for students only
when one of these three conditions is satisfied.
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In SPDA, a student may be left unassigned due to school-level type-specific ceilings even
when district admissions rules are weakly acceptant. To make sure that every student is
matched, we make the following assumption.
Definition 5. A profile of district admissions rules (Chd)d∈D accommodates unmatched stu-
dents if for any student s and feasible matching X in which student s is unmatched, there exists
x = (s, d, c) ∈ X such that x ∈ Chd(X ∪ {x}).
When a profile of district admissions rules accommodates unmatched students, for any
feasible matching in which a student is unmatched, there exists a school such that the dis-
trict associated with the school would admit that student if she applies to that school. For
example, when each admissions rule respects the initial matching, the profile of district
admissions rules accommodates unmatched students because an unmatched student’s ap-
plication to her initial school is always accepted. Lemma 2 in Appendix D shows that when
a profile of district admissions rules accommodates unmatched students, every student is
matched to a school in SPDA.
In general, accommodation of unmatched students may be in conflict with type-specific
ceilings because there may not be enough space for a student type when ceilings are small
for this type. To avoid this, we assume that type-specific ceilings are high enough so that
(Chd)d∈D accommodates unmatched students.19
Our assumptions on district admissions rules allow us to control the distribution of the
SPDA outcome. In particular, the SPDA outcome satisfies the following conditions: (i)∑
t ξ
t
d(X) = kd for all d ∈ D, (ii)
∑
c∈C ξ
t
c(X) = k
t for all t ∈ T , (iii)∑t∈T ξtc(X) ≤ qc for all
c ∈ C, and (iv) ξtc(X) ≤ qtc for all t ∈ T and c ∈ C. We call any matching X satisfying these
conditions legitimate.
In this framework, type-t ceilings of schools in district d may result in a floor of another
type t′ in this district in the sense that the number of type-t′ students in the district should
be at least a certain number. Moreover, this may further impose a ceiling for type t′ in
another district d′. To see this, suppose, for example, that (i) there are two districts d and
d′, (ii) in each district, there is one school and 100 students, (iii) 100 students are of type t
and 100 students are of another type t′, and (iv) each school has a type-t ceiling of 60 and a
type-t′ ceiling of 70. In a legitimate matching, each district needs to have at least 40 type-t′
students (because, otherwise, the number of type-t students in that district would have to
be more than 60). Moreover, this would mean that there cannot be more than 60 type-t′
students in any district (because, otherwise, there would need to be more than 40 type-t′
students in the other district, contradicting the floor we just calculated). Hence, in this
19For instance, ignoring integer problems, qtd ≥ kd k
t∑
t′∈T kt
′ for all t, d, would make ceilings compatible
with this property as it would be possible to assign the same percentage of students of each type to all
districts.
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example, in effect we have a floor of 40 and a (further restricted) ceiling of 60 for type-t′
students for each district.
Faced with this complication, our approach is to find the tightest lower and upper
bounds induced by these constraints. For this purpose, a certain optimization problem
proves useful. More specifically, consider a linear-programming problem where for each
type t and district d, we seek the minimum and maximum values of
∑
c:d(c)=d y
t
c subject to
(i)
∑
t′∈T
∑
c:d(c)=d′ y
t′
c = kd′ for all d′ ∈ D, (ii)
∑
c∈C y
t′
c = k
t′ for all t′ ∈ T , (iii)∑t′∈T yt′c ≤ qc
for all c ∈ C, and (vi) yt′c ≤ qt′c for all t′ ∈ T and c ∈ C. Let pˆtd and qˆtd be the solutions to the
minimization and maximization problems, respectively.
Both of these optimization problems belong to a special class of linear-programming
problems called a minimum-cost flow problem, and many computationally efficient algo-
rithms to solve it are known in the literature.20 A straightforward but important observa-
tion is that pˆtd (resp. qˆtd) is exactly the lowest (resp. highest) number of type-t students who
can be matched to district d in a legitimate matching (Lemma 3 in Appendix D). Given
this observation, we call pˆtd the implied floor and qˆtd the implied ceiling.
Now we are ready to state the main result of this section.
Theorem 3. Suppose that each district admissions rule has school-level type-specific ceilings and
is rationed and weakly acceptant. Moreover, suppose that the district admissions rule profile ac-
commodates unmatched students. Then, SPDA satisfies the α-diversity policy if, and only if,
qˆtd/kd − pˆtd′/kd′ ≤ α for every type t and districts d, d′ such that d 6= d′.
The proof of this theorem, given in Appendix D, is based on a number of steps. First,
as mentioned above, we note that pˆtd and qˆtd are the lower and upper bounds, respectively,
of the number of type-t students who can be matched with district d in any legitimate
matching. This observation immediately establishes the “if” part of the theorem. Then,
we further establish that the implied floors and ceilings can be achieved simultaneously
in the sense that, for any pair of districts d and d′ with d 6= d′, there exists a legitimate
matching that assigns exactly qˆtd type-t students to district d and exactly pˆtd′ type-t students
to district d′ (Lemma 4). In other words, we establish that the implied ceiling and floor
are achieved in two different districts, and they are achieved at one legitimate matching si-
multaneously. We complete the proof of the theorem by constructing student preferences
such that the outcome of SPDA achieves these bounds. In Appendix C, we provide an
20To see that our problem is a minimum-cost flow problem, note that we can take (kd)d∈D as the “supply,”
(kt)t∈T as the “demand,” (qtd)d∈D,t∈T as the “arc capacity bounds,” and the objective functions for pˆtd and qˆtd
to be min ytd and min−ytd, respectively. These problems have an “integrality property” so that if the supply,
demand, and bounds are integers, then all the solutions are integers as well. As already mentioned, many
algorithms have been proposed to solve different objective functions for these problems. For instance, the
capacity scaling algorithm of Edmonds and Karp (1972) gives the solutions in polynomial time. For more
information, see Chapter 10 of Ahuja (2017). We are grateful to Fatma Kilinc-Karzan for helpful discussions.
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example that illustrates Theorem 3. In Appendix B.4, we provide a fairly general class of
district admissions rules that satisfies our assumptions in this result.
The analysis in this section characterizes conditions under which different policy goals
are achieved under SPDA. One of the facts worth mentioning in this context is that achiev-
ing multiple policies can be overly demanding. To see this point, we note that individual
rationality and α-diversity policy are often incompatible with one another. For example,
consider a problem such that each student’s most preferred school is her initial school and
a constant α such that the initial matching does not satisfy the α-diversity policy. Indeed,
in this case, no mechanism can simultaneously satisfy individual rationality and the α-
diversity policy because the initial matching is the unique individually rational matching,
but it fails the α-diversity policy.
4. Achieving Policy Goals with Efficient Outcomes
In this section, we turn our focus to efficiency. More specifically, we study the existence
of a mechanism that satisfies a given policy goal on the distribution of agents, constrained
efficiency, strategy-proofness, and individual rationality. We first consider a policy goal
with type-specific ceilings at the district level. In this setting, we establish an impossibility
result.
Theorem 4. There exist a problem and ceilings (qtd)t∈T ,d∈D such that the the initial matching X˜
satisfies the policy goal Ξ ≡ {ξ|qtd ≥ ξtd for all d and t, qc ≥
∑
t ξ
t
c for all c}, while there exists
no mechanism that satisfies the policy goal Ξ, constrained efficiency, individual rationality, and
strategy-proofness.
We show this result using the following example.
Example 4. Consider the following problem with districts d1 and d2. District d1 has schools
c1, c2, and c3 and district d2 has schools c4, c5, and c6. All schools have a capacity of one.
There are six students: students s1 and s4 have type t1, students s2 and s5 have type t2,
and students s3 and s6 have type t3. Both districts have a ceiling of one for types t1 and
t2: qt1d1 = q
t2
d1
= 1 and qt1d2 = q
t2
d2
= 1. Initially, student si is matched with school ci, for
i = 1, . . . , 6, so the initial matching satisfies the policy goal Ξ. Student preferences are as
follows:
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6
c6 c6 c5 c3 c3 c1
c1 c2 c4 c4 c5 c2
... ... c3
... ... c6
... ...
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where the dots in the table mean that the corresponding parts of the preferences are arbi-
trary.
In this example, there are two matchings that satisfy the policy goal Ξ, constrained effi-
ciency, and individual rationality:
X = {(s1, c6), (s2, c2), (s3, c4), (s4, c3), (s5, c5), (s6, c1)}, and
X ′ = {(s1, c1), (s2, c6), (s3, c5), (s4, c4), (s5, c3), (s6, c2)}.
If a mechanism satisfies the desired properties, then its outcome at the above student
preference profile must be either matching X or X ′.
Consider the case where the mechanism produces matching X at the above student
preference profile. Suppose student s3 misreports her preference by ranking c5 first and
c3 second (while the ranking of other schools is arbitrary). Under the new report, the
mechanism produces matchingX ′ because it is the only matching that satisfies the policy
goal Ξ, constrained-efficiency, and individual rationality. Since student s3 strictly prefers
her school in X ′ to her school in X , she has a profitable deviation.
Similarly, consider the case where the mechanism produces matching X ′ at the above
student preference profile. Suppose student s6 misreports her preference by ranking c1
first and c6 second (while the ranking of the other schools is arbitrary). In this case, the
mechanism produces matching X because it is the only matching that satisfies the policy
goal Ξ, constrained-efficiency, and individual rationality. Since student s6 strictly prefers
her school in X to her school in X ′, she has a profitable deviation.
In both cases, there exists a student who benefits from misreporting, so the desired
conclusion follows. 
This example also shows that there is no mechanism that satisfies the α-diversity policy
goal for α = 0 introduced in Section 3.3, constrained efficiency, individual rationality,
and strategy-proofness. Consequently, without any assumptions, a policy goal may not
be implemented with the desirable properties. To establish a positive result, we consider
distributional policy goals that satisfy the following notion of discrete convexity, which is
studied in the mathematics and operations research literatures (Murota, 2003).
Definition 6. Let χc,t denote the distribution where there is one type-t student at school c and there
are no other students. A set of distributions Ξ is M-convex if whenever ξ, ξ˜ ∈ Ξ and ξtc > ξ˜tc for
some school c and type t then there exist school c′ and type t′ with ξt′c′ < ξ˜t
′
c′ such that ξ−χc,t+χc′,t′ ∈
Ξ and ξ˜ + χc,t − χc′,t′ ∈ Ξ.21
21The letter M in the term M-convex set comes from the word matroid, a closely related and well-studied
concept in discrete mathematics.
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To illustrate this concept, suppose that a set of distributions Ξ is M-convex. Consider
two distributions ξ and ξ˜ in this set such that there are more type-t students in school c at ξ
than at ξ˜. Then there exist school c′ and type t′ such that there are more type-t′ students in
school c′ at ξ˜ than ξ with the following two properties. First, removing one type-t student
from school c and adding one type-t′ student to school c′ in ξ produces a distribution in
Ξ. Second, removing one type-t′ student from school c′ and adding one type-t student
to school c in ξ˜ gives a distribution in Ξ (see Figure 2). Intuitively, from each of these two
distributions we can move closer to the other distribution in an incremental manner within
Ξ, a property analogous to the standard convexity notion but adapted to a discrete setting.
We illustrate this concept with the following example.
Figure 2. Illustration of M-convexity
Example 5. Consider the problem and the set of distributions Ξ defined in Example 4. We
show that Ξ is not M-convex. Recall matchingsX andX ′ in that example. By construction,
bothX andX ′ satisfy the policy goal Ξ. Furthermore, ξt1c3(X) = 1 > 0 = ξ
t1
c3
(X ′) because (i)
school c3 is matched with student s4 at X , whose type is t1, while (ii) school c3 is matched
with student s5 atX ′, whose type is t2 6= t1. If the set of distributions Ξ is M-convex, there
exist a school c and a type t such that ξtc(X) < ξtc(X ′) and ξ(X)−χc3,t1 +χc,t is in Ξ. Because
each school’s capacity is one, and at matchingX all schools have filled their capacities, this
means that the only candidate for (c, t) satisfying the above condition is such that c = c3.
But the only nonzero ξtc3(X
′) is for t = t2 (because s5 is the unique student matched with c3
atX ′), and ξ(X)−χc3,t1 +χc3,t2 does not satisfy the policy goal because district d1’s ceiling
for type t2 is violated (note ξt2c2(X) = 1 because student s2 is matched with c2 at X .)
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The above argument implies that Ξ ∩ Ξ0 is not M-convex either. To see this, note that
both ξ(X) and ξ(X ′) are in Ξ ∩ Ξ0 because all students are matched. Because we have
shown that no distribution of the form ξ(X)− χc3,t1 + χc,t is in Ξ, by set inclusion relation
Ξ ∩ Ξ0 ⊆ Ξ, there is no distribution of the form ξ(X)− χc3,t1 + χc,t in Ξ ∩ Ξ0 either. 
Now we introduce a mechanism that achieves the desirable properties whenever the
policy goal is M-convex. To do this, we first create a hypothetical matching problem. On
one side of the market, there are school-type pairs (c, t) where c ∈ C and t ∈ T . On the
other side, there are students from the original problem, S. Given any student s ∈ S and
a preference order Ps of s in the original problem, define preference order P˜s over school-
type pairs in the hypothetical problem as follows: letting t be the type of student s and c0
be her initial school in the original problem, (s, c) Ps (s, c′) ⇐⇒ (c, t) P˜s (c′, t) for any
c, c′ ∈ C, and (c0, t) P˜s (c, t′) for any c ∈ C and t′ ∈ T such that t′ 6= t. That is, P˜s is a
preference order over school-type pairs that ranks the school-type pairs in which the type
is t in the same order as in Ps, while finding all school-type pairs specifying a different
type as less preferred than the pair corresponding to her initial school. Furthermore, let
(c0, t) be the initial school-type pair for s in the hypothetical problem.
Next we define a priority ordering of students that school-type pairs use to rank stu-
dents. For school-type pair (c, t), students initially matched with (c, t) have the highest
priority, and then all other students have the second highest priority. This gives us two
priority classes for students. Then, ties are broken according to a master priority list that
every school-type pair uses.
We say that a type-t student s with the initial school-type pair (c, t) is permissible to
school-type pair (c′, t′) at matching X if ξ(X) + χc′,t′ − χc,t is in Ξ. Note that a type-t
student with initial school-type pair (c, t) is always permissible to pair (c, t) at matching
X whenever ξ(X) is in Ξ.
The following is a generalization of Gale’s top trading cycles mechanism (Shapley and
Scarf, 1974), building on its recent extension by Suzuki et al. (2017).
Top Trading Cycles Algorithm. Consider a hypothetical problem.
Step 1: LetX1 ≡ X˜ . Each school-type pair points to the permissible student at match-
ingX1 with the highest priority. If there exists no such student, remove the school-
type pair from the market. Each student s points to the highest ranked remaining
school-type pair with respect to P˜s. Identify and execute cycles. Any student who
is part of an executed cycle is assigned the school-type pair she is pointing to and
is removed from the market.
Step n (n > 1): LetXn denote the matching consisting of assignments in the previous
steps and initial assignments for all students who have not been processed in the
previous steps. Each remaining school-type pair points to the unassigned student
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who is permissible at matchingXn with the highest priority. If there exists no such
student, remove the school-type pair from the market. Each unassigned student s
points to the highest ranked remaining school-type pair with respect to P˜s. Identify
and execute cycles. Any student who is part of an executed cycle is assigned the
school-type pair she is pointing to and is removed from the market.
This algorithm terminates in the first step such that no student remains to be processed.
The outcome is defined as the matching induced by the outcome of the hypothetical prob-
lem at this step. The top trading cycles mechanism (TTC) takes a profile of student prefer-
ences as input and produces the outcome of this algorithm at the reported student prefer-
ence profile. Note that the definition of permissibility and, hence, the definition of TTC,
depend on the policy goal. Nevertheless, we do not explicitly state the policy goal under
consideration when it is clear from the context.
The main result of this section is as follows.
Theorem 5. Suppose that the initial matching satisfies the policy goal Ξ. If Ξ ∩ Ξ0 is M-convex,
then TTC satisfies the policy goal Ξ, constrained efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy-
proofness.
The assumption that the initial matching satisfies the policy goal is necessary for the
result: Consider student preferences such that each student’s highest-ranked school is
her initial school. Then the initial matching is the unique individually rational matching.
Therefore, if there exists a mechanism with the desired properties, then the outcome at
this preference profile has to be the initial matching. Hence, we need the assumption that
the initial matching satisfies the policy goal to have such a mechanism.
To see one of the implications of this theorem, suppose that the policy goal Ξ is such that
no school is matched with more students than its capacity. In that case, if Ξ is M-convex,
then TTC satisfies the desirable properties.
Corollary 1. Suppose that the policy goal Ξ is such that for every ξ ∈ Ξ and c ∈ C,∑t ξtc ≤ qc.
Furthermore, suppose that the initial matching satisfies Ξ. If Ξ is M-convex, then TTC satisfies the
policy goal Ξ, constrained efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness.
In the proof of this corollary, we show that when Ξ is M-convex and no distribution in Ξ
assigns more students to a school than its capacity, then Ξ∩Ξ0 is also M-convex. Therefore,
the corollary follows directly from Theorem 5.
Next we illustrate TTC with an example.
Example 6. Consider a problem with two school districts, d1 and d2. District d1
has school c1 with capacity three and school c2 with capacity two. District d2 has
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school c3 with capacity two and school c4 with capacity one. There are seven stu-
dents: students s1, s2, s3, and s4 are from district d1 and have type t1, whereas stu-
dents s5, s6, and s7 are from district d2 and have type t2. The initial matching is
{(s1, c1), (s2, c1), (s3, c2), (s4, c2), (s5, c3), (s6, c3), (s7, c4)}. Student preferences are as fol-
lows.
Ps1 Ps2 Ps3 Ps4 Ps5 Ps6 Ps7
c2 c3 c4 c2 c1 c4 c2
c3 c1 c2 c3 c2 c1 c3
... ... ... c1 c3 c3 c1
c4 c4 c2 c4
In addition to the school capacities, there is only one additional constraint that school
c1 cannot have more than one type-t2 student. As we show in the proof of Corollary 2, the
set of distributions that satisfy this policy goal and the requirement that every student is
matched is an M-convex set. Therefore, by Theorem 5, TTC satisfies constrained efficiency,
individual rationality, strategy-proofness, and the policy goal.
To run TTC, we use a master priority list. Suppose that the master priority list ranks
students as follows: s1  s2  s3  s4  s5  s6  s7.
At Step 1, there are eight school-type pairs. Consider (c1, t1). Initially, students s1 and s2
are matched with it, so they are both permissible to this pair. We use the master priority
list to rank them, so s1 gets the highest priority at (c1, t1). Therefore, (c1, t1) points to s1.
Now consider (c1, t2). Initially, it does not have any students because there is no type-t2
student assigned to c1 in the original problem. Furthermore, s1 is permissible to (c1, t2)
because she can be removed from (c1, t1) and a type-t2 student can be assigned to (c1, t2)
without violating the school capacities or the policy goal. Therefore, (c1, t2) points to s1 as
well, who gets a higher priority than the other permissible students because of the master
priority list. The rest of the pairs also point to the highest-priority permissible students.
Each student points to the highest ranked school-type pair of the same type as shown in
Figure 3A. There is only one cycle: s7 → (c2, t2) → s3 → (c4, t1) → s7. Therefore, s7 is
matched with (c2, t2) and s3 is matched with (c4, t1).
At Step 2, there are six remaining school-type pairs: There are no permissible students
for (c4, t1) and (c4, t2) because c4 has a capacity of one and it is already assigned to s3.
Each remaining school-type pair points to the highest-ranked remaining permissible stu-
dent. Each student points to the highest-ranked remaining school-type pair (see Figure
3B). There is only one cycle: s4 → (c2, t1)→ s4. Hence, s4 is assigned to (c2, t1).
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(a) Step 1 of TTC (b) Step 2 of TTC
(c) Step 3 of TTC (d) Step 4 of TTC
Figure 3. The first four steps of TTC. In each step, there is only one cycle,
which is represented by the dashed lines.
The algorithm ends in five steps. Steps 3 and 4 are also shown in Figure 3. In Step 5, s2
points to (c1, t1), which points back to the student. The outcome is
{(s1, c3), (s2, c1), (s3, c4), (s4, c2), (s5, c1), (s6, c3), (s7, c2)}.
It can be easily seen that the distribution associated with this matching satisfies the
policy goal because no school has more students than its capacity and c1 has only one
type-t2 student. 
Sometimes it may be more convenient to describe a policy goal using a real-valued func-
tion rather than a set of distributions. The interpretation is that the policy function mea-
sures how satisfactory the distribution is in terms of the policy goal. To formalize this al-
ternative approach let f : Z|C|×|T |+ → R be a function on distributions such that f(ξ) ≥ f(ξ′)
means that distribution ξ satisfies the policy at least as well as distribution ξ′. Let λ ∈ R be
a constant. Consider the following (f, λ)−policy: Ξ(f, λ) ≡ {ξ ∈ Z|C|×|T |+ |f(ξ) ≥ λ}. Note
that the initial matching X˜ satisfies the (f, λ)-policy if, and only if, f(ξ(X˜)) ≥ λ.
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We introduce the following condition on functions, which plays a crucial role in the
M-convexity of the (f, λ)-policy.
Definition 7. A function f is pseudo M-concave, if for every distinct ξ, ξ˜ ∈ Ξ0, there exist (c, t)
and (c′, t′) with ξtc > ξ˜tc and ξt
′
c′ < ξ˜
t′
c′ such that
min{f(ξ − χc,t + χc′,t′), f(ξ˜ + χc,t − χc′,t′)} ≥ min{f(ξ), f(ξ˜)}.
This is a notion of concavity for functions on a discrete domain. Lemma 1 shows that
pseudo M-concavity characterizes when upper contour sets are M-convex. It is stronger
than quasi M-concavity but not logically related to the M-concavity studied in the discrete
mathematics literature (Murota, 2003).
Lemma 1. Ξ(f, λ) ∩ Ξ0 is M-convex for every λ if, and only if, f is pseudo M-concave.
Therefore, we get the following result:
Theorem 6. If f is pseudo M-concave and λ is such that f(ξ(X˜)) ≥ λ, then TTC satisfies the
(f, λ)-policy, constrained efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness.
To see why this theorem holds, recall that by Lemma 1, Ξ(f, λ) ∩ Ξ0 is M-convex. Fur-
thermore, by assumption, the initial matching satisfies the (f, λ)-policy. Therefore, the
result follows from Theorem 5.
Before we consider specific policy goals, we show that the set-based approach in The-
orem 5 and the function-based approach in Theorem 6 are equivalent. For that purpose,
note first that Lemma 1 already shows that the (f, λ)-policy for a pseudo M-concave func-
tion f yields an M-convex policy set Ξ(f, λ)∩Ξ0. We establish a sense in which a converse
result holds.
Theorem 7. Suppose that Ξ is a set of distributions. If Ξ ∩ Ξ0 is M-convex, then there exist a
pseudo M-concave function f and a constant λ ∈ R such that Ξ(f, λ) ∩ Ξ0 = Ξ ∩ Ξ0.
Now that we have established general results based on M-convexity of the policy set
or pseudo M-concavity of the policy function, we proceed to apply them to a variety of
situations. To begin, consider the set Ξ of distributions of all feasible matchings. In other
words, consider a situation in which no policy goal is imposed other than
∑
t ξ
t
c ≤ qc for
each c. Then it is rather straightforward to show that the set Ξ ∩ Ξ0 is an M-convex set.
This implies that when there is no policy goal, TTC is efficient, individually rational, and
strategy-proof, a standard result in the literature (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003).
Next we apply Theorems 5 and 6 to a variety of policy goals. These results turn out to be
applicable to many specific cases, as a wide variety of policy goals induce distributions that
satisfy M-convexity or can be expressed by policy functions that are pseudo M-concave. To
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be more specific, first suppose that the policy goal Ξ sets type-specific floors and ceilings
at each school, i.e., Ξ ≡ {ξ|qtc ≥ ξtc ≥ ptc for all c and t} where qtc is the ceiling and ptc is the
floor for type t at school c. Therefore, for each school, the number of students of a given
type must be within the ceiling and floor of this type at the school. We call a policy goal Ξ
of this form a school-level diversity policy and show that Ξ∩Ξ0 is an M-convex set. This
finding, together with Theorem 5, implies the following positive result.
Corollary 2. Suppose that the initial matching satisfies a school-level diversity policy. Then TTC
satisfies the school-level diversity policy, constrained efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy-
proofness.
We note a sharp contrast between this result and Theorem 4. The latter result demon-
strates that no mechanism is guaranteed to satisfy the policy goal and other desiderata
such as constrained efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness if the floors
or ceilings are imposed at the district level. Corollary 2, in contrast, shows that a mech-
anism with the desirable properties exists if the floors and ceilings are imposed at the
school level. Taken together, these results inform policy makers about what kinds of di-
versity policies are compatible with the other desiderata.
One possible shortcoming of Corollary 2 is that the result holds under the assumption
that the initial matching satisfies the school-level diversity policy. This may be undesir-
able given that often diversity policies are implemented because schools or districts are
regarded as insufficiently diverse, as in the case of the diversity law in Minnesota. In such
a setting, a potential diversity requirement can be that the diversity should not decrease
as a result of interdistrict school choice according to a diversity measure f . Such a con-
sideration can be formally described as the (f, ξ(X˜))-policy, Ξ(f, ξ(X˜)). The next corollary
establishes a positive result for a Ξ(f, ξ(X˜))-policy where the diversity is measured via the
“Manhattan distance” to an ideal point.
Corollary 3. Let ξˆ ∈ Ξ0 be an ideal distribution and f(ξ) ≡ −
∑
c,t |ξtc− ξˆtc| be the policy function.
Then TTC satisfies (f, ξ(X˜))-policy, constrained efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy-
proofness.
Note that the initial matching X˜ always satisfies (f, ξ(X˜))-policy. Furthermore, we show
that the policy function f is pseudo M-concave. Therefore, this corollary follows from The-
orem 6. More generally, when the diversity is measured by a pseudo M-concave function,
then the TTC outcome is as diverse as the initial matching. Furthermore, TTC also satisfies
the other desirable properties.
Next, we study the balanced-exchange policy introduced in Section 3.2. We establish
that the balanced-exchange policy imposed on Ξ0 is represented by a distribution that
satisfies M-convexity. This implies the following result.
INTERDISTRICT SCHOOL CHOICE 27
Corollary 4. TTC satisfies the balanced-exchange policy, constrained efficiency, individual ratio-
nality, and strategy-proofness.
One of the advantages of our approach is that M-convexity of a set and pseudo M-
concavity of a function are so general that a wide variety of policy goals satisfy them,
and that it is likely to be applicable for policy goals that one may encounter in the fu-
ture. To highlight this point, we consider imposing the diversity and balanced-exchange
policies at the same time. More specifically, define a set of distributions Ξ ≡ {ξ|qtc ≥ ξtc ≥
ptc for all c and t and
∑
t
∑
c:d(c)=d ξ
t
c = kd for all d} and call it the combination of balanced-
exchange and school-level diversity policies. This is the set of distributions that satisfy
both the school-level floors and ceilings and the balanced-exchange requirement. We es-
tablish Ξ ∩ Ξ0 is M-convex, implying the following result.
Corollary 5. Suppose that the initial matching satisfies the combination of balanced exchange and
school-level diversity policies. Then TTC satisfies the combination of balanced exchange and school-
level diversity policies, constrained efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness.
In general, the intersection of two M-convex sets need not be M-convex.22 Therefore, the
proof of this result does not follow from the proofs of Corollaries 2 and 4.
5. Conclusion
Despite increasing interest in interdistrict school choice in the US, the scope of matching
theory has been limited to intradistrict choice. In this paper, we proposed a new frame-
work to study interdistrict school choice that allows for interdistrict admissions, both from
stability and efficiency perspectives. For stable mechanisms, we characterized conditions
on district admissions rules that achieve a variety of important policy goals, such as stu-
dent diversity across districts. For efficient mechanisms, we showed that certain types of
diversity policies are incompatible with desirable properties such as strategy-proofness,
while alternative forms of diversity policies can be achieved by a variation of the top trad-
ing cycles mechanism, which is strategy-proof. Overall, our analysis suggests that inter-
district school choice can help achieve desirable policy goals such as student diversity, but
only with an appropriate design of constraints, admissions rules, and placement mecha-
nisms.
We regard this paper as a first step toward formal analysis of interdistrict school choice
based on tools of market design. As such, we envision a variety of directions for future
research. For example, it may be interesting to study cases in which the conditions for our
results are violated. Although we already know the policy goals are not guaranteed to be
satisfied for our stability results (our results provide necessary and sufficient conditions),
22Such an example is available from the authors upon request.
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the seriousness of the failure of the policy goals studied in the present paper is an open
question. Quantitative measures or an approximation argument like those used in “large
matching market” studies (e.g., Roth and Peranson (1999), Kojima and Pathak (2009), Ko-
jima et al. (2013), and Ashlagi et al. (2014)) may prove useful, although this is speculative
at this point and beyond the scope of the present paper.
We studied policy goals that we regarded as among the most important ones, but they
are far from being exhaustive. Other important policy goals may include a diversity policy
requiring certain proportions of different student types in each district (see Nguyen and
Vohra (2017) for a related policy at the level of schools), as well as a balanced exchange
policy requiring a certain bound on the difference in the numbers of students received
from and sent to other districts (see Dur and U¨nver (2018) for a related policy at the level
of schools). Given that the existing literature has not studied interdistrict school choice,
we envision that many policy goals await to be studied within our framework.
While our paper is primarily theoretical and aimed at proposing a general framework
to study interdistrict school choice, the main motivation comes from applications to actual
programs such as Minnesota’s AI program. Given this motivation, it would be interesting
to study interdistrict school choice empirically. For instance, evaluating how well the ex-
isting programs are doing in terms of balanced exchange, student welfare, and diversity,
and how much improvement could be made by a conscious design based on theories such
as the ones suggested in the present paper, are important questions left for future work. In
addition, implementation of our designs in practice would be interesting. Doing so may,
for instance, shed new light on the tradeoff between SPDA and TTC, which has been stud-
ied in the intradistrict school choice from a practical perspective (e.g., Abdulkadirog˘lu et
al. (2006), Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2017)). We are only beginning to learn about the inter-
district school choice problem, and thus we expect that these and other questions could
be answered as more researchers analyze it.
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Appendix A. Additional Results
In this section, we provide some additional results. Before we proceed, we introduce
two admissions rule properties. An admissions rule Ch satisfies path independence if
for every X, Y ⊆ X , Ch(X ∪ Y ) = Ch(X ∪ Ch(Y )). Path independence states that a
set can be divided into not-necessarily disjoint subsets and the admissions rule can be
applied to the subsets in any order so that the chosen set of contracts is always the same.
An admissions rule Ch satisfies the irrelevance of rejected contracts (IRC) if for every
X ⊆ X and x /∈ Ch(X), Ch(X \ {x}) = Ch(X). The irrelevance or rejected contracts
states that a rejected contract can be removed from a set without changing the chosen set.
Path independence is equivalent to substitutability and IRC (Aizerman and Malishevski,
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1981). Furthermore, an admissions rule satisfies substitutability and LAD if, and only if,
it satisfies path independence and LAD.23
A.1. Improving Student Welfare for Districts with Intradistct School Choice. In Section
3.1, we studied when SPDA satisfies individual rationality, which requires that, under in-
terdistrict school choice, every student is matched with a school that is weakly more pre-
ferred than her initial school. In this section, we consider an alternative setting where each
district uses SPDA to assign its students to schools when there is no interdistrict school
choice. In other words, the status quo is SPDA when there is only intradistrict school
choice. More explicitly, each student ranks schools in their home districts (or contracts as-
sociated with their home districts) and SPDA is used between a district and students from
that district. Note that we assume each student’s ranking over contracts associated with
the home district is the same as the relative ranking in the original preferences. Impor-
tantly, in this setting, we compare SPDA outcomes in interdistrict and intradistrict school
choice. In such a setting, we characterize district admissions rules which guarantee that
no student is hurt from interdistrict school choice.
The next property of district admissions rules plays a crucial role to achieve this policy.
Definition 8. A district admissions rule Chd favors own students if for any matching X that
is feasible for students,
Chd(X) ⊇ Chd({x ∈ X|d(s(x)) = d}).
When a district admissions rule favors own students, any contract that is chosen from a
set of contracts associated with students from a district is also chosen from a superset that
includes additional contracts associated with students from the other districts. Roughly,
this condition requires that, under interdistrict school choice, a district prioritizes its own
students that it used to admit over students from the other districts (even though an out-
of-district student can still be admitted when a student from the district is rejected).
The following result shows that this is exactly the condition which guarantees that in-
terdistrict school choice weakly improves the outcome for every student.
Theorem 8. Every student weakly prefers the SPDA outcome under interdistrict school choice to
the SPDA outcome under intradistrict school choice for all student preferences if, and only if, each
district’s admissions rule favors own students.
In the proof, we show that in the intradistrict school choice the SPDA outcome can alter-
natively be produced by an interdistrict school choice model where students rank contracts
with all districts and districts have modified admissions rules: For any set of contracts X ,
23See Aygu¨n and So¨nmez (2013) for a study of IRC and Chambers and Yenmez (2017) for a study of path
independence in a matching context.
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each district d chooses the following contracts: Chd({x ∈ X|d(s(x)) = d}). Since the
original district admissions rules favor own students, the chosen set under the modified
admissions rule is a subset ofChd(X) whenX is feasible for students. Then the conclusion
that students receive weakly more preferred outcomes in interdistrict school choice than
in intradistrict school choice follows from a comparative statics property of SPDA that we
show (Lemma 5).24 To show the “only if” part, when there exists a district admissions rule
that fails to favor own students, we construct student preferences such that interdistrict
school choice makes at least one student strictly worse off than intradistrict school choice.
A.2. District-level Type-specific Ceilings. In this section, we show the incompatibility
of type-specific ceilings at the district level with the existence of a stable matching.
Definition 9. A district admissions rule Chd has a district-level type-specific ceiling of qtd
for type-t students if the number of type-t students admitted from a matching that is feasible for
students cannot exceed this ceiling. More formally, for any matchingX that is feasible for students,
|{x ∈ Chd(X)|τ(s(x)) = t}| ≤ qtd.
Note that, as in the case of school-level type-specific ceilings, district admissions rules
do not necessarily satisfy acceptance once district-level type-specific ceilings are imposed.
We define a weaker version of the acceptance assumption as follows.
Definition 10. A district admissions rule Chd that has district-level type-specific ceilings is d-
weakly acceptant if, for any contract x associated with a type-t student and district d and match-
ing X that is feasible for students, if x is rejected from X , then at Chd(X),
• the number of students assigned to school c(x) is equal to qc(x), or
• the number of students assigned to district d is at least kd, or
• the number of type-t students assigned to district d is at least qtd.
This admissions rule property states that a student can be rejected only when one of
these three conditions is satisfied.
We establish that in an interdistrict school choice problem in which district admissions
rules have district-level type-specific ceilings that also satisfy some other desired proper-
ties, there may exist no stable matching.
Theorem 9. There exist districts, schools, students, and their types such that for every admissions
rule of a district with district-level type-specific ceilings that satisfies d-weak acceptance and IRC,
there exist admissions rules for the other districts that satisfy substitutability and IRC and student
preferences such that no stable matching exists.
24We cannot use the comparative statics result of Yenmez (2018) because in our settingChd(X) ⊇ Ch′d(X)
only when X is feasible for students, whereas Yenmez (2018) requires this property for all sets of contracts
X .
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To show this result, we construct an environment such that a district admissions rule
with the desired properties cannot satisfy weak substitutability, a necessary condition to
guarantee the existence of a stable matching (Hatfield and Kojima, 2008).
Appendix B. Examples of District Admissions Rules
In this section, we first provide a class of district admissions rules that are feasible and
acceptant and, furthermore, have completions that satisfy substitutability and LAD. Then,
based on this class, we identify admissions rules that also satisfy the properties stated in
Theorems 1, 2, 3, and 8.
B.1. An Example of a District Admissions Rule. Consider a district d with schools
c1, . . . , cn. Each school ci has an admissions rule Chci such that, for any set of contracts
X , Chci(X) = Chci(Xci) ⊆ Xci . District d’s admissions rule Chd is defined as follows. For
any set of contracts X ,
Chd(X) = Chc1(X) ∪ Chc2(X \ Y1) ∪ . . . ∪ Chcn(X \ Yn−1),
where Yi for i = 1, . . . , n − 1 is the set of all contracts in X associated with students who
have contracts in Chc1(X) ∪ . . . ∪ Chci(X \ Yi−1). In words, we order the schools and
let schools choose in that order. Furthermore, if a student is chosen by some school, we
remove all contracts associated with this student for the remaining schools.
We study when district admissions rule Chd satisfies our assumptions.
Claim 1. Suppose that for every school ci and matchingX , |Chci(X)| ≤ qci . Then district admis-
sions rule Chd is feasible.
Proof. Since every student-school pair uniquely defines a contract, for every matching X ,
every school ci, and every student s, there is at most one contract associated with s in
Chci(X). In addition, whenever a student’s contract with a school ci is chosen, her con-
tracts with the remaining schools are included in Yj for every j ≥ i by the construction
of Chd. Hence, for every X , Chd(X) is feasible for students. Furthermore, by assumption,
|Chci(X)| ≤ qci for each ci. Therefore, Chd is feasible. 
Claim 2. Suppose that for every school ci and matching X , |Chci(X)| = min{qci , |Xci |}. Then
district admissions rule Chd is acceptant.
Proof. Suppose that matchingX is feasible for students and x ∈ Xd \Chd(X). There exists
i ≤ n such that ci = c(x). Since X is feasible for students, x ∈ X \ Yi−1 where Yi−1 is as
defined in the construction of Chd. Because x ∈ Xd \ Chd(X), x /∈ Chci(X \ Yi−1). Then
|Chci(X \ Yi−1)| = qci by assumption, which implies that district admissions rule Chd is
acceptant. 
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Next we study when district admissions rule Chd has a completion that satisfies sub-
stitutability and LAD. Consider the following district admissions rule Ch′d: For any set of
contracts X ,
Ch′d(X) = Chc1(X) ∪ . . . ∪ Chcn(X).
Claim 3. Suppose that for every school ci, Chci satisfies substitutability and LAD. Then district
admissions rule Ch′d is a completion of Chd, and it satisfies substitutability and LAD.
Proof. To show that Ch′d is a completion of Chd, suppose that X is a set of contracts such
that Ch′d(X) is feasible for students. By mathematical induction, we show that Chci(X) =
Chci(X \Yi−1) for i = 1, . . . , n, where Yi is defined as above for i > 1 and Y0 = ∅. The claim
trivially holds for i = 1. Suppose that it also holds for 1, . . . , i−1. We show the claim for i.
Since Ch′d(X) is feasible for students, Chci(X) and Chc1(X) ∪ . . . ∪ Chci−1(X) do not have
any contracts associated with the same student. Therefore, Chci(X)∩Yi−1 = ∅. Since Chci
satisfies IRC, Chci(X) = Chci(X \ Yi−1). As a result, Chd(X) = Ch′d(X), which completes
the proof that Ch′d is a completion of Chd.
Since all school admissions rules satisfy substitutability and LAD, so does Ch′d. 
All of the assumptions on school admissions rules stated in Claims 1, 2, and 3 are satis-
fied when school admissions rules are responsive: each school has a ranking of contracts
associated with itself and, from any given set of contracts, each school chooses contracts
with the highest rank until the capacity of the school is full or there are no more contracts
left. Responsive admissions rules satisfy substitutability and LAD. Furthermore, for every
school ci, |Chci(X)| = min{qci , |Xci |}.25 By the claims stated above, when school admis-
sions rules are responsive, district admissions rule Chd is feasible and acceptant, and it
has a completion that satisfies substitutability and LAD.
Based on these results, we provide examples of district admissions rules that further
satisfy the additional assumptions considered in different parts of our paper.
B.2. District Admissions Rules Satisfying the Assumptions in Theorem 1. We use the
district admissions rule construction above and we further specify each school’s admis-
sions rule. Each school has a responsive admissions rule. If a student is initially matched
with a school, then her contract with this school is ranked higher than contracts of stu-
dents who are not initially matched with the school. As before, district admissions rule
Chd is feasible and acceptant, and it has a completion that satisfies substitutability and
LAD.
Claim 4. District admissions rule Chd respects the initial matching.
25See Chambers and Yenmez (2018) for a characterization of responsive admissions rules using substi-
tutability.
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Proof. Let c be the initial school of student s and x = (s, d, c). By construction, for any
matching X that is feasible for students, x ∈ X implies x ∈ Chd(X) because c chooses
x from any set of contracts and s does not have any other contract in X . Therefore, Chd
respects the initial matching. 
B.3. District Admissions Rules Satisfying the Assumptions in Theorem 2. We modify
the district admissions rule construction in Appendix B.1. Each school has a ranking of
contracts associated with itself. When it is the turn of a school, it accepts contracts that
have the highest rank until the capacity of the school is full, or the number of contracts
chosen by the district is kd, or there are no more contracts left. The remaining contracts of
a chosen student are removed.
District admissions rule Chd is feasible because no school admits more students than its
capacity and no student is admitted to more than one school.
Claim 5. District admissions rule Chd is acceptant.
Proof. To show acceptance, suppose that matching X is feasible for students and x ∈
Xd \ Chd(X). There exists i ≤ n such that ci = c(x). Since X is feasible for students,
x ∈ X \ Yi−1 where Yi−1 is the set of all contracts in X associated with students who are
chosen by schools c1, . . . , ci−1. Because x ∈ Xd \ Chd(X), x is not chosen by ci. Then, by
construction, either ci fills its capacity or the district admits kd students, which implies
that Chd is acceptant. 
Claim 6. District admissions rule Chd has a completion that satisfies substitutability and LAD.
Proof. First, we construct a completion of Chd. Define the following district admissions
rule: given a set of contracts X , when it is the turn of a school, it chooses from all the con-
tracts in X . Each school chooses contracts using the same priority order until the school
capacity is full, or the district has kd contracts, or there are no more contracts left. De-
note this admissions rule by Ch′d. Suppose that Ch′d(X) is feasible for students. Then, by
construction, Ch′d(X) = Chd(X). Therefore, Ch′d is a completion of Chd.
Next, we show that Ch′d satisfies LAD. Suppose that Y ⊇ X . Every school ci chooses
weakly more contracts from Y than X unless the number of contracts chosen from Y by
the district reaches kd. Since the number of chosen contracts from X cannot exceed kd by
construction, Ch′d satisfies LAD.
Finally, we show that Ch′d satisfies substitutability. Suppose that x ∈ X ⊆ Y and
x ∈ Ch′d(Y ). Therefore, the number of contracts chosen from Y by schools preceding
c(x) is strictly less than kd. This implies that the number of contracts chosen from X by
schools preceding c(x) is weakly less than this number as weakly more contracts are cho-
sen by schools preceding school c(x) in Y thanX . As a result, for school c(x), weakly more
contracts can be chosen from X than Y .
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The ranking of contract x among Y in the ranking of school c(x) is high enough that
it is chosen from set Y . Therefore, the ranking of contract x among X in the ranking of
school c(x) must be high enough to be chosen from set X because weakly more contracts
are chosen from X than Y for school c(x). 
Furthermore, by construction, district admissions rule Chd never chooses more than kd
students. Therefore, it is also rationed.
B.4. District Admissions Rules Satisfying the Assumptions in Theorem 3. A profile
of district admissions rules can accommodate unmatched students by reserving seats for
different types of students:
Definition 11. Let c be a school in district d. A district admissions rule Chd has a reserve of
rtc for type-t students at school c if, for any feasible matching X that does not have any contract
associated with type-t student s, if |{x ∈ Xc|τ(s(x)) = t}| < rtc, then x = (s, d, c) satisfies x ∈
Chd(X ∪ {x}).
A reserve for a student type at a school c guarantees space for this type at school c.
Therefore, when a student is unmatched at a feasible matching and the reserve for her
type is not yet filled at a school, the district will accept this student at that school if she
applies to it.
Claim 7. Suppose that districts have admissions rules with reserves such that
∑
c r
t
c = k
t for every
type t. Then the profile of district admissions rules accommodates unmatched students.
Proof. Suppose that student s is unmatched at a feasible matching X . Let t be the type
of student s. Then there exists a school c such that the number of type-t students in c at
X is strictly less than rtc because
∑
c r
t
c = k
t. By definition of reserves, x = (s, c) satisfies
x ∈ Chd(c)(X ∪ {x}). 
A district can have type-specific reserves at its schools in different ways. In the rest of
this subsection, we use school admissions rules with reserves introduced by Hafalir et
al. (2013) to construct a fairly general example in which a district has schools with type-
specific reserves. Let rtc be the number of seats reserved by school c for type-t students.
Suppose that the type-specific ceilings for schools are given and that they satisfy the as-
sumptions in Section 3.3. Assume that, for every district d,
∑
c:d(c)=d
∑
t r
t
c = kd,
∑
c r
t
c = k
t
and, for every type t and school c, rtc ≤ qtc. Furthermore, assume that
∑
t r
t
c ≤ qc for every
school c.
Consider the following district admissions rule for district d. Schools are ordered as
c1, c2, . . . , cn. Each school has a ranking over contracts associated with it and a linear order
over student types. First, all schools choose contracts for their reserve seats according
to the order c1, c2, . . . , cn. When it is the turn of school ci, all contracts associated with
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students whose contracts were previously chosen are removed. School ci chooses contracts
for its reserved seats so that, for every type, either reserved seats are filled or there are no
more contracts associated with students of that type remaining. Then all schools choose
contracts for their empty seats in order. When it is the turn of school ci, all contracts of
previously chosen students are removed. School ci chooses from the remaining contracts
in order. When a contract of a type-t student is considered, this contract is chosen unless
the school’s capacity is filled or its type-t ceiling is filled or the district has kd contracts.
Denote this district admissions rule by Chd.
District admissions rule Chd is feasible because a student cannot have more than one
contract and a school cannot have more contracts than its capacity at any chosen set of
contracts. It is also weakly acceptant and rationed by construction. Furthermore, for every
type t and school c, the district cannot admit more than qtc type-t students at c, so it has a
school-level type-specific ceiling of qtc for type-t students and school c.
Claim 8. District admissions rule Chd has a completion that satisfies substitutability and LAD.
Proof. For any set of contracts X , school c, and type t, let X tc denote the set of all contracts
in X that are associated with school c and type-t students.
Consider the construction of Chd above, but modify it by not removing contracts of
students who are chosen previously. Denote this district admissions rule by Ch′d. To show
that Ch′d is a completion of Chd, consider a set of contracts X and suppose that Ch′d(X)
is feasible for students. Since the only difference in the constructions of Chd and Ch′d is
the removal of contracts of previously chosen students, it must be that Ch′d(X) = Chd(X).
Therefore, Ch′d is a completion of Chd.
To prove substitutability of Ch′d, suppose, for contradiction, that there exist sets of con-
tracts X and Y with X ⊆ Y and a contract x ∈ X such that x ∈ Ch′d(Y ) \ Ch′d(X). Let s
and c be such that x = (s, c) and t = τ(s). First, note that |X tc| > rtc because x 6∈ Ch′d(X).
Since Y ⊇ X , |Y tc | ≥ |X tc| > rtc is implied. Therefore, it is after all schools in d have chosen
contracts based on their reserves in the algorithm describing Ch′d that contract x is chosen
by Ch′d given Y . Let n(X) and n(Y ) be the numbers of contracts that have been chosen
by all schools before the step (call it step κc) at which school c chooses students beyond
its reserve under X and Y , respectively. Because x ∈ Ch′d(Y ), it follows that n(Y ) < kd.
Therefore, for each school c′, the number of contracts chosen by c′ before step κc under Y
is weakly larger than those under X , which we prove as follows:
• Suppose that school c′ is processed after school c in the algorithm deciding Chd.
Then, by step κc, c′ is matched with students of each type t′ only up to its type-t′
reserve. More formally, the numbers of type-t′ students matched to c′ are equal to
min{rt′c′ , |X t′c′ |} and min{rt′c′ , |Y t′c′ |} underX and Y , respectively. Obviously, the latter
expression is no smaller than the former expression.
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• Suppose that school c′ is processed before school c in the algorithm deciding Chd.
Recall that n(Y ) < kd. Therefore, for school c′, it is either (i) as many as qc′ students
are matched to c′ under Chd(Y ), or (ii) for each type t′, the number of type-t′ stu-
dents matched to c′ in Y is min{qt′c′ , |Y t′c′ |}. In case (i), the desired conclusion follows
trivially because, given any set of contracts, the number of students matched to c′
cannot exceed qc′ . For case (ii), under X , the number of type-t′ students matched
to c′ cannot exceed min{qt′c′ , |X t′c′ |} ≤ min{qt′c′ , |Y t′c′ |}. Summing up across all types,
we obtain the desired conclusion.
Thus n(X) ≤ n(Y ), so kd − n(X) ≥ kd − n(Y ). Now, in step κc, school c will choose all
the applications until either the total number of contracts chosen reaches kd, or the total
number of contracts chosen at c reaches qc, or the number of contracts chosen at c that
are associated with type t students reaches qtc. Given the previous fact that kd − n(X) ≥
kd − n(Y ), the fact that Y ⊇ X , and the fact that x is chosen by c in step κc under Y , it
has to be the case that x is also chosen by c under X in step κc or before. We prove this as
follows:
• If |X tc| ≤ rtc, then x is chosen in the reserve stage by construction.
• Let |X tc| > rtc. First note that at step κc under X and Y , for each type t, there are
fewer contracts associated with school c and type-t students that remain to be pro-
cessed under X than under Y (X ⊆ Y , and there is no contract in X = X ∩ Y that
is processed in the reserve stage under Y but not under X), so the subset of X that
should be processed in κc is a subset of the corresponding subset of Y . Moreover,
the remaining number of contracts to be chosen before reaching the ceiling at c for
each type t in step κc is weakly larger atX than at Y by the definition of the reserve
stage. Finally, as argued above, the total number of students in the district who can
still be chosen at κc is weakly larger under X than at Y , so whenever x is chosen
under Y in this stage, x is chosen under X in this stage or the reserve stage.
This is a contradiction to the assumption that x /∈ Ch′d(X).
To show that Ch′d satisfies LAD, suppose, for contradiction, that there exist two sets
of contracts X, Y with X ⊆ Y and |Ch′d(Y )| < |Ch′d(X)|. Then, because Ch′d(Y ) =⋃
c:d(c)=d(Ch
′
d(Y ) ∩ Yc) and Ch′d(X) =
⋃
c:d(c)=d(Ch
′
d(X) ∩ Xc), there exists a school c with
d(c) = d such that
|Ch′d(Y ) ∩ Yc| < |Ch′d(X) ∩Xc|.(1)
Fix such c arbitrarily. Next, note that
|Ch′d(Y )| < |Ch′d(X)| ≤ kd,
|Ch′d(Y ) ∩ Yc| < |Ch′d(X) ∩Xc| ≤ qc,
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where the first line follows because Ch′d is rationed by construction, and the second line
also holds by construction of Ch′d. Therefore,
|Ch′d(Y ) ∩ Y tc | = min{|Y tc |, qtc}
≥ min{|X tc|, qtc}
= |Ch′d(X) ∩X tc|,(2)
for each type t ∈ T . Because Ch′d(Y ) ∩ Yc = ∪t∈T (Ch′d(Y ) ∩ Y tc ) and Ch′d(X) ∩ Xc =
∪t∈T (Ch′d(X)∩X tc), inequality (2) and the fact Y tc ∩Y t′c = X tc ∩X t′c = ∅ for any pair of types
t, t′ with t 6= t′ imply
|Ch′d(Y ) ∩ Yc| ≥ |Ch′d(X) ∩Xc|,
which contradicts inequality (1). 
B.5. District Admissions Rules Satisfying the Assumptions in Theorem 8. Consider the
district admissions rule construction in Appendix B.1. In this example, let each school use
a priority ranking in such a way that all contracts of students from district d are ranked
higher than the other contracts.
Claim 9. District admissions rule Chd favors own students.
Proof. Suppose that X is feasible for students. When it is the turn of school ci, it consid-
ers Xci . Therefore, Chd(X) = Chc1(Xc1) ∪ . . . ∪ Chck(Xck). Furthermore, Chci(Xci) ⊇
Chci({x ∈ Xci|d(s(x)) = d}) by construction. Taking the union of all subset inclusions
yields Chd(X) ⊇ Chd({x ∈ Xd|d(s(x)) = d}). Therefore, Chd favors own students. 
Appendix C. An Example for Section 3.3
In this section, we provide an example in which the conditions on the admissions rules
stated in Theorem 3 are satisfied and, therefore, SPDA satisfies the diversity policy.
Consider a problem with two school districts, d1 and d2. District d1 has school c1 with
capacity three and school c2 with capacity two. District d2 has school c3 with capacity two
and school c4 with capacity one. There are seven students: students s1, s2, s3, and s4 are
from district d1, whereas students s5, s6, and s7 are from district d2. Students s1, s5, s6,
and s7 have type t1 and s2, s3, and s4 have type t2. To construct district admissions rules
that satisfy the properties stated in Theorem 3, let us first specify type-specific ceilings and
calculate implied floors and implied ceilings. Suppose that
qt1c1 = 1, q
t2
c1
= 2, qt1c2 = 1, q
t2
c2
= 1,
qt1c3 = 2, q
t2
c3
= 1, qt1c4 = 1, q
t2
c4
= 1.
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These yield the following implied floors,26
pˆt1d1 = 1, pˆ
t2
d1
= 2, pˆt1d2 = 2, pˆ
t2
d2
= 0,
and implied ceilings
qˆt1d1 = 2, qˆ
t2
d1
= 3, qˆt1d2 = 3, qˆ
t2
d2
= 1.
For any type t and two districts d and d′, denote qˆtd/kd − pˆtd′/kd′ by ∆td,d′ . Using the
implied floors and ceilings above, we get:
∆t1d1,d2 = 2/4− 2/3 = −1/6,
∆t1d2,d1 = 3/3− 1/4 = 3/4,
∆t2d1,d2 = 3/4− 0/3 = 3/4, and
∆t2d2,d1 = 1/3− 2/4 = −1/6.
Hence, these type-specific ceilings satisfy the condition stated in Theorem 3 that ∆td,d′ ≤ α
for α = 0.75.
We construct district admissions rules that have type-specific ceilings, and are rationed
and weakly acceptant. Furthermore, the profile of district admissions rules accommodates
unmatched students. As in Appendix B.4, we consider type-specific reserves (as detailed
below, we first fill in the reserves while applying the district admissions rule that uses
type-specific reserves). Let us consider the reserves for schools as follows:
rt2c4 = 0, and r
t
c = 1 for all other c, t.
Consider the following district admissions rule. For each district, schools and student
types are ordered and each school has a linear order over students. First, schools choose
contracts for their reserved seats following the master priority list until the reserves are
filled or all the applicants of the relevant type are processed. Then, following the given
order over schools and student types, schools choose from the remaining contracts fol-
lowing the linear order over students in order to fill the rest of their seats until the school
26To see this, note that there cannot be zero type-t1 students in d1 (otherwise not all type-t1 students
can be matched since there are only three spaces available for type-t1 students in d2). If there is one type-t1
student in d1, there has to be three type-t1 students in d2, which implies there cannot be any type-t2 students
in d2, and this implies there will be three type-t2 students in d1. If there are two type-t1 students in d1, there
have to be two type-t2 students in d2, which implies there is one type-t2 student in d2, and this implies there
will be two type-t2 students in d1. By noting these minimum and maximum numbers, we obtain the implied
reserves and implied ceilings accordingly. These bounds are achievable because it is feasible to have (i) one
type-t1 student in d1, three type-t1 students in d2, zero type-t2 students in d2, and three type-t2 students in
d1, and (ii) two type-t1 students in d1, two type-t2 students in d2, one type-t2 student in d2, and two type-t2
students in d1.
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capacity is filled, or the district has kd contracts, or district type-specific ceilings are filled,
or there are no more remaining contracts.27
To give a more concrete example, suppose that the linear order over students for each
school is as follows: s1  s2  s3  s4  s5  s6  s7 and schools and types are ordered
from the lowest index to the highest. Then, for example, we have the following:
Chd1({(s1, c1), (s2, c1), (s3, c1) , (s4, c1) , (s5, c2), (s6, c2)}) = {(s1, c1), (s2, c1), (s3, c1), (s5, c2)}.
Let us elaborate on how we determine the chosen set of contracts in the above case. School
c1 considers contracts with students s1, s2, s3, and s4. Among these students, c1 accepts s1
for its reserve for type t1, and s2 for its reserve for type t2. Moreover, school c2 considers
contracts with students s5 and s6. Among these students students, c2 accepts s5 for its
reserve for type t2. For the remainder of seats, s3 is accepted by c1 since (i) c1’s type t2
ceiling is not full, (ii) c1’s capacity is not full, and (iii) district d1 has only three accepted
contracts at this point. Next, s4 and s5 are rejected since d1 has accepted four contracts at
this point. This results in the chosen set of contracts presented above.
To illustrate the SPDA outcomes, consider student preferences given by the following
table.
Ps1 Ps2 Ps3 Ps4 Ps5 Ps6 Ps7
c2 c3 c4 c1 c1 c1 c2
... c1 c2 c3 c2 c4 c3
... ... c2 c3 c3
...
c4 c4 c2
SPDA results in the following outcome:
{(s1, c2), (s2, c3), (s3, c2), (s4, c1), (s5, c1), (s6, c4), (s7, c3)}.
District d1 is assigned two students of both types and district d2 is assigned two type-t1
students and one type-t2 student. As a result, the ratio difference for type-t1 students be-
tween these districts is roughly 0.17, and the ratio difference for type-t2 students is roughly
0.17. This example illustrates that the actual ratio differences can be significantly lower
than the one given by Theorem 3 (0.17 versus 0.75).
Appendix D. Omitted Proofs
In this section, we provide the omitted proofs.
27In Appendix B.4, we provide a class of admissions rules that include the one we consider here. These
admissions rules satisfy all of the assumptions that we make in this section.
INTERDISTRICT SCHOOL CHOICE 45
Proof of Theorem 1. First, to show the “if” part, suppose that all district admissions rules
respect the initial matching. In SPDA, each student s goes down in her preference order,
and either SPDA ends before student s reaches her initial school (which is a preferred out-
come over the initial school), or student s reaches her initial school. In the latter case, she
is matched with her initial school because the district’s admissions rule respects the initial
matching and the district always considers a set of contracts that is feasible for students
at any step of SPDA. From this step on, the district accepts this contract, so student s is
matched with her initial school. Therefore, SPDA satisfies individual rationality.
To prove the “only if” part, suppose that there exists a district dwith an admissions rule
that fails to respect the initial matching. Hence, there exists a matchingX , which is feasible
for students, that includes x = (s, d, c) where school c is the initial school of student s and
x /∈ Chd(X). Now, consider student preferences such that every student associated with a
contract in Xd prefers that contract the most and all other students prefer a contract asso-
ciated with a different district the most. Then, at the first step of SPDA, district d considers
matching Xd and tentatively accepts Chd(Xd). Since x /∈ Chd(Xd), contract x is rejected at
the first step. Therefore, student s is matched with a strictly less preferred school than her
initial school, which implies that SPDA does not satisfy individual rationality. 
Proof of Theorem 2. We first prove that if each district admissions rule is rationed, then
SPDA satisfies the balanced-exchange policy. Let X be the matching produced by SPDA
for a given preference profile.
We begin by showing that each student must be matched with a school in X . Suppose,
for contradiction, that student s is unmatched. SinceX is a stable matching, every contract
x = (s, d, c) associated with the student is rejected by the corresponding district, i.e., x /∈
Chd(X ∪ {x}). Otherwise, student s and district d would like to match with each other
using contract x, contradicting the stability of matching X . Since X ∪ {x} is feasible for
students, acceptance implies that, for each district d, either every school in the district is
full or that the district has at least kd students at matching X . Both of them imply that
the district has at least kd students in matching X since the sum of the school capacities
in district d is at least kd. But this is a contradiction to the assumption that student s is
unmatched since the existence of an unmatched student implies that there is at least one
district d such that the number of students inXd is less than kd. Therefore, all students are
matched in X .
BecauseX is the outcome of SPDA, it is feasible for students. Therefore, because district
admissions rules are rationed, the number of students in district d cannot be strictly more
than kd for any district d. Furthermore, since every student is matched, the number of
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students in district d must be exactly kd (because, otherwise, at least one student would
have been unmatched.) As a result, SPDA satisfies the balanced-exchange policy.
Next, we prove that if at least one district’s admissions rule fails to be rationed, then
there exists a student preference profile under which SPDA does not satisfy the balanced-
exchange policy. Suppose that there exist a district d and a matching X , which is feasible
for students, such that |Chd(X)| > kd. Consider a feasible matching X ′ such that (i) all
students are matched, (ii) X ′d = Chd(X), and (iii) for every district d′ 6= d, |X ′d′ | ≤ kd′ .
The existence of such X ′ is guaranteed since every district has enough capacity to serve
its students (i.e., for every district d′,
∑
c:d(c)=d′ qc ≥ kd′), and |Chd(X)| > kd. Now, consider
any student preferences, where every student likes her contract in X ′ the most.
We show that SPDA stops in the first step. For district d′ 6= d, X ′d′ is feasible and the
number of students matched to d′ at X ′d′ is weakly less than kd′ . Since Chd′ is acceptant,
Chd′(X
′
d′) = X
′
d′ . For district d, we need to show thatChd(X ′d) = X ′d, which is equivalent to
Chd(Chd(X)) = Chd(X). LetCh′d be a completion ofChd that satisfies path independence.
Because X and Chd(X) are feasible for students, Ch′d(X) = Chd(X) and Ch′d(Ch′d(X)) =
Chd(Chd(X)). Furthermore, since Ch′d is path independent, Ch′d(Ch′d(X)) = Ch′d(X),
which implies Chd(Chd(X)) = Chd(X). As a result, Chd(X ′d) = X ′d. Therefore, SPDA
stops at the first step since no contract is rejected.
Since SPDA stops at the first step, the outcome is matchingX ′. ButX ′ fails the balanced-
exchange policy because |X ′d| = |Chd(X)| > kd. 
Proof of Theorem 3. To prove this result, we provide the following lemmas.
Lemma 2. If a profile of district admissions rules accommodates unmatched students, every stu-
dent is matched to a school in SPDA.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let X be the outcome of SPDA for some preference profile. Suppose,
for contradiction, that student s is unmatched. Since X is a stable matching and student
s prefers any contract x = (s, d, c) to being unmatched, x /∈ Chd(X ∪ {x}). But this is a
contradiction to the assumption that the profile of district admissions rules accommodates
unmatched students. 
Lemma 3. For each type t, district d, and legitimate matchingX , we have qˆtd ≥ ξtd(X) ≥ pˆtd. More-
over, for each type t and district d, there exist legitimate matchingsX andX ′ such that ξtd(X) = pˆtd
and ξtd(X ′) = qˆtd.
Proof of Lemma 3. Observe that for every legitimate matching X , the induced distribution
satisfies the constraints of the linear program. Therefore, the first part follows from the
definition of the implied floors and ceilings. For the second part, note that there exists
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a solution to the linear program such that the ceiling and the floor are attained. Further-
more, every solution y = (ytc)c∈C,t∈T of the linear program can be supported by a legitimate
matching X such that ytc = ξtc(X) for every c and t. 
Lemma 4. For each t ∈ T and d, d′ ∈ D with d 6= d′, there exists a legitimate matching X such
that ξtd(X) = qˆtd and ξtd′(X) = pˆtd′ .
Proof of Lemma 4. Let Xˆ be a legitimate matching such that ξtd(Xˆ) = qˆtd andM0 be the set
of all legitimate matchings. Let
M1 ≡ {X ∈M0|ξtd′(X) = pˆtd′}.
M1 is nonempty due to Lemma 3. Next, let
M2 ≡ {X ∈M1|
∑
t˜,c˜
| ξ t˜c˜(X)− ξ t˜c˜(Xˆ) |≤
∑
t˜,c˜
| ξ t˜c˜(X ′)− ξ t˜c˜(Xˆ) | for every X ′ ∈M1}.
M2 is nonempty becauseM1 is a finite set. We will show that for any X ∈ M2, ξtd(X) =
ξtd(Xˆ) = qˆ
t
d.
To prove the above claim, assume for contradiction that there exists X ∈ M2 such that
ξtd(X) 6= ξtd(Xˆ). By Lemma 3, ξtd(X) 6= ξtd(Xˆ) implies that ξtd(X) < ξtd(Xˆ). Then there exists
c with d(c) = d such that ξtc(X) < ξtc(Xˆ). Consider the following procedure.
Step 0: Initialize by setting (t1, c1) := (t, c). Note that ξt1c1(X) < ξ
t1
c1
(Xˆ) by definition
of c.
Step i ≥ 1: Given sequences of type-school pairs ((tj, cj))1≤j≤i and ((tj+1, c∗j))1≤j<i,
proceed as follows. We begin with (ti, ci). Note that (by assumption for i = 1,
and as shown later for i ≥ 2), ξtici(X) < ξtici(Xˆ). Denote di = d(ci). Now,
(1) Suppose that there exists i′ < i such that either (i) c∗i′ = ci or (ii) ξtici(X) < qci
and d(c∗i′) = d(ci). If such an index i′ exists, then set (ti+1, c∗i ) := (ti′+1, c∗i′).
(2) Suppose not. Then, if there exists t′ ∈ T such that ξt′ci(X) > ξt
′
ci
(Xˆ), then set
(ti+1, c
∗
i ) := (t
′, ci).
(3) If not, then note that
∑
t˜∈T ξ
t˜
ci
(X) < qci .28 Also note that there exists a type-
school pair (t′, c′) with c′ 6= ci such that ξt′c′(X) > ξt′c′(Xˆ) and d(c′) = di because∑
c˜:d(c˜)=di,t˜∈T ξ
t˜
c˜(X) =
∑
c˜:d(c˜)=di,t˜∈T ξ
t˜
c˜(Xˆ) = kdi .
(a) If t′ = ti, then let X¯ be a matching such that
ξ t˜c˜(X¯) =

ξtici(X) + 1 for (t˜, c˜) = (ti, ci),
ξt
′
c′(X)− 1 for (t˜, c˜) = (ti, c′),
ξ t˜c˜(X) otherwise.
28A proof of this fact is as follows. By an earlier argument, ξtici(X) < ξ
ti
ci(Xˆ). Moreover, by assumption
ξ t˜ci(X) ≤ ξ t˜ci(Xˆ) for every t˜ ∈ T . Therefore,
∑
t˜∈T ξ
t˜
ci(X) <
∑
t˜∈T ξ
t˜
ci(Xˆ) ≤ qci .
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Note that X¯ ∈ M1.29 Also, by construction,
∑
t˜,c˜ | ξ t˜c˜(X¯) − ξ t˜c˜(Xˆ) |=∑
t˜,c˜ | ξ t˜c˜(X)− ξ t˜c˜(Xˆ) | −2 <
∑
t˜,c˜ | ξ t˜c˜(X)− ξ t˜c˜(Xˆ) |, which contradicts the
assumption that X ∈M2.
(b) Therefore, suppose that t′ 6= ti and set (ti+1, c∗i ) := (t′, c′).
(4) The pair (ti+1, c∗i ) created above satisfies ξ
ti+1
c∗i
(X) > ξ
ti+1
c∗i
(Xˆ), so there exists
c′ ∈ C such that ξti+1c′ (X) < ξti+1c′ (Xˆ). Set ci+1 = c′. Note that ξti+1ci+1(X) < ξti+1ci+1(Xˆ).
We follow the procedure above to define (t1, c1), (t2, c∗1), (t2, c2), (t3, c∗2), (t3, c3), and so
forth. Because T is a finite set, we have i and j > i with ti = tj . Consider the smallest
j with this property (note that given such j, i is uniquely identified). Now, let X¯ be a
matching such that
ξ t˜c˜(X¯) =

ξtkck(X) + 1 for (t˜, c˜) = (tk, ck) for any k ∈ {i, i+ 1, . . . , j − 1},
ξ
tk+1
c∗k
(X)− 1 for (t˜, c˜) = (tk+1, c∗k) for any k ∈ {i, i+ 1, . . . , j − 1},
ξ t˜c˜(X) otherwise.
We will show X¯ ∈ M1. To do so, by construction of X¯ , first note that
∑
t˜∈T ξ
t˜
c˜(X¯) ≤∑
t˜∈T ξ
t˜
c˜(X) + 1 ≤ qc˜ for any c˜ ∈ {ci, . . . , cj−1} such that
∑
t˜∈T ξ
t˜
c˜(X) < qc˜. Next, by
construction of X¯ ,
∑
t˜∈T ξ
t˜
c˜(X¯) =
∑
t˜∈T ξ
t˜
c˜(X) = qc˜ for every c˜ ∈ {ci, . . . , cj−1} such that∑
t˜∈T ξ
t˜
c˜(X) = qc˜. Moreover,
∑
t˜∈T ξ
t˜
c˜(X¯) ≤
∑
t˜∈T ξ
t˜
c˜(X) = qc˜ for every c˜ ∈ {c∗i , . . . , c∗j−1}. Fi-
nally, for every c˜ ∈ C \ {ci, . . . , cj−1, c∗i , . . . , c∗j−1},
∑
t˜∈T ξ
t˜
c˜(X¯) =
∑
t˜∈T ξ
t˜
c˜(X) ≤ qc˜. Thus,
all school capacities are satisfied by X¯ . Also by construction of X¯ , for each d˜ ∈ D,∑
c˜:d(c˜)=d˜ ξ
t˜
c˜(X¯) =
∑
c˜:d(c˜)=d˜ ξ
t˜
c˜(X) = kd˜, so X¯ is rationed. Furthermore, for every c˜ ∈ C
and t˜ ∈ T , ξ t˜c˜(X¯) ≤ max{ξ t˜c˜(X), ξ t˜c˜(Xˆ)} by construction, so all type-specific ceilings are sat-
isfied. Moreover, by construction of X¯ , for each t˜ ∈ T , either ξ t˜c˜(X¯) = ξ t˜c˜(X) for every c˜ ∈ C
or there exists exactly one pair of schools c˜′ and c˜′′ in C such that ξ t˜c˜′(X¯) = ξ t˜c˜′(X¯) + 1,
ξ t˜c˜′′(X¯) = ξ
t˜
c˜′′(X¯) − 1, and ξ t˜c˜(X¯) = ξ t˜c˜(X) for every c˜ ∈ C \ {c˜′, c˜′′}. Thus, t˜ ∈ T ,∑
c˜∈C ξ
t˜
c˜(X¯) =
∑
c˜∈C ξ
t˜
c˜(X) for every t˜ ∈ T . Therefore, X¯ is legitimate.
By construction of X¯ , either ξtd′(X¯) = ξtd′(X) or ξtd′(X¯) = ξtd′(X) − 1. This implies that
X¯ ∈M1. Furthermore,
∑
t˜,c˜ | ξ t˜c˜(X¯)− ξ t˜c˜(Xˆ) |<
∑
t˜,c˜ | ξ t˜c˜(X)− ξ t˜c˜(Xˆ) |, since while creating
the ξ t˜c˜(X¯) entries, we add 1 to some entries of X that satisfy ξ t˜c˜(X) < ξ t˜c˜(Xˆ) and subtract
1 from some entries of X that satisfy ξ t˜c˜(X) > ξ t˜c˜(Xˆ). These lead to a contradiction to the
assumption that X ∈M2, which completes the proof. 
29A proof of this fact is as follows. Because
∑
t˜∈T ξ
t˜
ci(X) < qci ,
∑
t˜∈T ξ
t˜
ci(X¯) =
∑
t˜∈T ξ
t˜
ci(X)+1 ≤ qci . For
every c˜ 6= ci,
∑
t˜∈T ξ
t˜
c˜(X¯) ≤
∑
t˜∈T ξ
t˜
c˜(X) ≤ qc˜. Thus, all school capacities are satisfied. For all c˜, t˜, ξ t˜c˜(X¯) ≤
max{ξ t˜c˜(X), ξ t˜c˜(Xˆ)} ≤ qt˜c˜ by construction, so all type-specific ceilings are satisfied. And
∑
t˜∈T ,c˜∈C ξ
t˜
c˜(X¯) =∑
t˜∈T ξ
t˜
c˜(X) by definition of X¯ , so X¯ is a legitimate matching. Finally, ξ t˜d˜(X¯) = ξ
t˜
d˜
(X) for every t˜ and d˜, so
X¯ ∈M1.
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Now we are ready to prove the theorem. The “if” part follows from Lemmas 2 and 3.
Specifically, by Lemma 2, SPDA produces a legitimate matching. Therefore, by Lemma 3,
we have pˆtd ≤ ξtd (X) ≤ qˆtd for every t ∈ T and d ∈ D. For each school district d, hence, the
maximum proportion of type-t students that can be admitted is qˆtd/kd and the minimum
proportion of type t students that can be admitted is pˆtd/kd. Therefore, the ratio difference
of type-t students in any two districts is at most max
d 6=d′
{qˆtd/kd− pˆtd′/kd′}. We conclude that the
α-diversity policy is achieved when qˆtd/kd − pˆtd′/kd′ ≤ α for every t, d, and d′ with d 6= d′.
The “only if” part of the theorem follows from Lemma 4. Suppose that qˆtd/kd−pˆtd′/kd′ > α
for some t, d, and d′ with d 6= d′. From Lemma 4, we know the existence of a legitimate
matching X such that ξtd (X) = qˆtd and ξtd′ (X) = pˆtd′ . Consider a student preference profile
where each student prefers her contract in X the most. Then, since the admissions rules
are weakly acceptant, SPDA ends at the first step as all applications are accepted. Thus X
is the outcome of SPDA and, therefore, the α-diversity policy is not satisfied. 
Proof of Theorem 5. Suzuki et al. (2017) study a setting in which each student is initially
matched with a school and there are no constraints associated with student types, that is,
when there is just one type. In that setting, they show that if the distribution is M-convex,
then their mechanism, called TTC-M, satisfies the policy goal, constrained efficiency, indi-
vidual rationality, and strategy-proofness. To adapt their result to our setting, consider the
hypothetical matching problem that we have introduced before the definition of TTC in
which each student is matched with a school-type pair and each student has strict prefer-
ences over all school-type pairs. It is straightforward to verify that this hypothetical prob-
lem satisfies all the conditions assumed by Suzuki et al. (2017). In particular, M-convexity
of Ξ ∩ Ξ0 holds by assumption. Therefore, TTC-M in this market satisfies the policy goal,
constrained efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness.
We note that the outcome of our TTC is isomorphic to the outcome of TTC-M in the
hypothetical problem in the following sense. Student s is allocated to contract (s, c) under
preference profile P = (Ps)s∈S at the outcome of TTC if, and only if, student s is allocated
to the school-type pair (c, t) under preference profile P˜ = (P˜s)s∈S at TTC-M in the hypo-
thetical problem. The rest of the proof is devoted to showing that our TTC satisfies the
desired properties in the original problem.
The result that TTC satisfies the policy goal follows from the result in Suzuki et al. (2017)
that the distribution corresponding to the TTC-M outcome is in Ξ ∩ Ξ0.
To show constrained efficiency, letX be the outcome of TTC and, for each student s ∈ S,
let (s, cs) be the contract associated with student s at matching X . Suppose, for contradic-
tion, that there exists a feasible matchingX ′ with ξ(X ′) ∈ Ξ that Pareto dominates match-
ing X . Denoting X ′s = (s, c′s) for each student s ∈ S , this implies (s, c′s) Rs (s, cs) for every
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student s ∈ S , with at least one relation being strict. Then, by the construction of pref-
erences R˜s in the hypothetical problem, we have (c′s, τ(s)) R˜s (cs, τ(s)) for every student
s ∈ S, with at least one relation being strict. Moreover, because matching X ′ is feasible in
the original problem, Y ′ = {(c′s, τ(s))|(s, c′s) ∈ X ′} is feasible in the hypothetical problem,
and Y = {(cs, τ(s))|(s, cs) ∈ X} is the result of TTC-M. This is a contradiction to the result
in Suzuki et al. (2017) that TTC-M is constrained efficient.
To show individual rationality, let matching X be the outcome of TTC and, for each
student s ∈ S, let Xs = (s, cs) be the contract associated with student s at matching X .
Additionally, let Y = {(cs, τ(s))|(s, cs) ∈ X} be the result of TTC-M in the hypothetical
problem. Suzuki et al. (2017) establish that TTC-M is individually rational, so (cs, τ(s)) R˜s
(c0(s), τ(s)) for every s ∈ S , where c0(s) denotes the initial school of student s. By the
construction of R˜s, this relation implies (s, cs) Rs (s, c0(s)) for every student s ∈ S, which
means X is individually rational in the original problem.
To show strategy-proofness, in the original problem, let s be a student, t her type, P−s the
preference profile of students other than student s, Ps the true preference of student s, and
P ′s a misreported preference of student s. Furthermore, let c and c′ be schools assigned to
student s under (Ps, P−s) and (P ′s, P−s) for TTC, respectively. Note that the previous argu-
ment establishes that, in the hypothetical problem, student s is allocated to (c, t) and (c′, t)
under (P˜s, P˜−s) and (P˜ ′s, P˜ ′−s), respectively. Because TTC-M is strategy-proof, it follows
that (c, t) P˜s (c′, t) or c = c′. By the construction of P˜s, this relation implies (s, c) Ps (s, c′)
or (s, c) = (s, c′), establishing strategy-proofness of TTC in the original problem. 
Proof of Corollary 1. Assume that
∑
t ξ
t
c ≤ qc for every ξ ∈ Ξ and c ∈ C. Under this pre-
sumption, we show that when the policy goal Ξ is M-convex, so is Ξ ∩ Ξ0. Then the result
follows immediately from Theorem 5 because the initial matching satisfies Ξ.
Suppose that ξ, ξ˜ ∈ Ξ ∩ Ξ0 such that ξtc > ξ˜tc for some school c and type t. Since Ξ
is M-convex and ξ, ξ˜ ∈ Ξ, there exist school c′ and type t′ with ξt′c′ < ξ˜t′c′ such that ξˆ ≡
ξ − χc,t + χc′,t′ ∈ Ξ and ξ¯ ≡ ξ˜ + χc,t − χc′,t′ ∈ Ξ. We will show that ξˆ, ξ¯ ∈ Ξ0.
Because ξ ∈ Ξ0, ∑c˜∈C,t˜∈T ξˆ t˜c˜ = ∑c˜∈C,t˜∈T ξ t˜c˜ = ∑d kd. Furthermore, for every c˜, t˜, by
definition of ξˆ, we have ξˆ t˜c˜ ≤ max{ξ t˜c˜, ξ˜ t˜c˜} ≤ qt˜c˜. These two properties imply that ξˆ ∈ Ξ0. A
similar argument shows ξ¯ ∈ Ξ0. 
Proof of Lemma 1. Note that Ξ(f, λ) ∩ Ξ0 = {ξ ∈ Ξ0|f(ξ) ≥ λ}.
The “if” direction: Suppose that ξ ∈ Ξ(f, λ) ∩ Ξ0 and ξ˜ ∈ Ξ(f, λ) ∩ Ξ0 are distinct. There-
fore, f(ξ), f(ξ˜) ≥ λ. By assumption, there exist (c, t) and (c′, t′) with ξtc > ξ˜tc and ξt′c′ < ξ˜t′c′
such that
min{f(ξ − χc,t + χc′,t′), f(ξ˜ + χc,t − χc′,t′)} ≥ min{f(ξ), f(ξ˜)}.
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This implies f(ξ − χc,t + χc′,t′), f(ξ˜ + χc,t − χc′,t′) ≥ λ. Furthermore, ξ − χc,t + χc′,t′ , ξ˜ +
χc,t − χc′,t′ ∈ Ξ0 since the sum of coordinates is equal to
∑
d kd and no school is assigned
more students than its capacity. Therefore, ξ−χc,t +χc′,t′ , ξ˜+χc,t−χc′,t′ ∈ Ξ(f, λ)∩Ξ0, so,
by Theorem 4.3. of Murota (2003), Ξ(f, λ) ∩ Ξ0 is M-convex.
The “only if” direction: Suppose that the function f is not pseudo M-concave, so that
there exist distinct ξ, ξ˜ ∈ Ξ0 such that for all (c, t) and (c′, t′) with ξtc > ξ˜tc and ξt′c′ < ξ˜t′c′ we
have
min{f(ξ − χc,t + χc′,t′), f(ξ˜ + χc,t − χc′,t′)} < min{f(ξ), f(ξ˜)}.
Let λ ≡ min{f(ξ), f(ξ˜)}. The above condition implies that Ξ(f, λ)∩Ξ0 is not M-convex. 
Proof of Theorem 7. Let f(ξ) = 1 when ξ ∈ Ξ ∩ Ξ0 and f(ξ) = 0 otherwise.
First we show that f is pseudo M-concave. Take two distinct ξ, ξ˜ ∈ Ξ0. If
min{f(ξ), f(ξ˜)} = 0, then min{f(ξ − χc,t + χc′,t′), f(ξ˜ + χc,t − χc′,t′)} ≥ 0 for every (c, t)
and (c′, t′), so the desired inequality holds. Suppose that f(ξ) = f(ξ˜) = 1. By the
construction of f , we have ξ, ξ˜ ∈ Ξ ∩ Ξ0. Since Ξ ∩ Ξ0 is M-convex, there exist (c, t)
and (c′, t′) such that ξ − χc,t + χc′,t′ , ξ˜ + χc,t − χc′,t′ ∈ Ξ ∩ Ξ0. By the construction of f ,
f(ξ − χc,t + χc′,t′) = f(ξ˜ + χc,t − χc′,t′) = 1. Therefore, the desired inequality also holds for
this case, so f is pseudo M-concave.
Next we show that Ξ(f, λ) ∩ Ξ0 = Ξ ∩ Ξ0 for λ = 1. For any ξ ∈ Ξ(f, 1) ∩ Ξ0, f(ξ) = 1,
which implies that ξ ∈ Ξ ∩ Ξ0 by the construction of f . Therefore, Ξ(f, 1) ∩ Ξ0 ⊆ Ξ ∩ Ξ0.
Now, let ξ ∈ Ξ∩Ξ0. Then, by the construction of f , f(ξ) = 1, so ξ ∈ Ξ(f, 1)∩Ξ0. Therefore,
Ξ ∩ Ξ0 ⊆ Ξ(f, 1) ∩ Ξ0. We conclude that Ξ(f, 1) ∩ Ξ0 = Ξ ∩ Ξ0. 
Proof of Corollary 2. Suppose that Ξ is a school-level diversity policy. We will first show
that Ξ∩ Ξ0 is an M-convex set. Recall that Ξ = {ξ|∀c, t qtc ≥ ξtc ≥ ptc} and Ξ0 = {ξ|
∑
c,t ξ
t
c =∑
d kd and ∀c qc ≥
∑
t ξ
t
c}.
Suppose that there exist ξ, ξ˜ ∈ Ξ ∩ Ξ0 such that ξtc > ξ˜tc. To show M-convexity, we will
find school c′ and type t′ with ξt′c′ < ξ˜t
′
c′ such that (1) ξˆ ≡ ξ − χc,t + χc′,t′ ∈ Ξ ∩ Ξ0 and
(2) ξ¯ ≡ ξ˜ + χc,t − χc′,t′ ∈ Ξ ∩ Ξ0. To show both conditions, we look at two possible cases
depending on whether c′ = c or not.
Case 1: First consider the case in which there exists type t′ such that ξt′c < ξ˜t
′
c . We prove
(1) for c′ = c. First, by definition of ξˆ, we have
∑
t˜∈T ,c˜∈C ξˆ
t˜
c˜ =
∑
t˜∈T ,c˜∈C ξ
t˜
c˜ =
∑
d kd. Next,
since
∑
t˜∈T ξˆ
t˜
c =
∑
t˜∈T ξ
t˜
c, we have
∑
t˜∈T ξˆ
t˜
c ≤ qc. Therefore, ξˆ ∈ Ξ0.
Next, we have ξˆtc = ξtc − 1 ≥ ξ˜tc ≥ ptc (the equality comes from the definition of ξˆ, the
first inequality comes from the assumption ξtc > ξ˜tc, and the second inequality comes from
the assumption ξ˜ ∈ Ξ), and ξˆtc = ξtc − 1 < ξtc ≤ qtc (the equality comes from the definition
of ξˆ, the first inequality is obvious, and the second inequality comes from the assumption
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ξ ∈ Ξ). Moreover, we have ξˆt′c = ξt′c + 1 > ξt′c ≥ pt′c (the equality comes from the definition
of ξˆ, the first inequality is obvious, and the second inequality comes from the assumption
ξ ∈ Ξ), and ξˆt′c = ξt′c + 1 ≤ ξ˜t′c ≤ qt′c (the equality comes from the definition of ξˆ, the first
inequality comes from the assumption ξt′c < ξ˜t
′
c , and the second inequality comes from the
assumption ξ˜ ∈ Ξ). For any c˜, t˜ with (c˜, t˜) 6∈ {(c, t), (c, t′)}, we have ξˆ t˜c˜ = ξ t˜c˜ by definition of
ξˆ, so pt˜c˜ ≤ ξˆ t˜c˜ ≤ qt˜c˜. Therefore, ξˆ ∈ Ξ and hence we conclude (1).
The proof that (1) is satisfied follows from the facts that ξtc > ξ˜tc and ξt
′
c < ξ˜
t′
c . By changing
the roles of t with t′ and ξ with ξ˜ in the preceding argument, we get the implication of (1)
that ξ¯ ∈ Ξ ∩ Ξ0. But this is exactly (2).
Case 2: Second, consider the case in which there exists no type t′ such that ξt′c < ξ˜t
′
c .
Then, ξt′c ≥ ξ˜t′c for every t′ 6= t. This in particular implies
∑
t˜∈T ξ
t˜
c >
∑
t˜∈T ξ˜
t˜
c. Because∑
t˜∈T ,c˜∈C ξ
t˜
c˜ =
∑
t˜∈T ,c˜∈C ξ˜
t˜
c˜ by the assumption that ξ, ξ˜ ∈ Ξ0, there exists a school c′ 6= c such
that
∑
t˜∈T ξ
t˜
c′ <
∑
t˜∈T ξ˜
t˜
c′ . In particular, there exists a type t′ such that ξ˜t
′
c′ > ξ
t′
c′ .
Now we proceed to show condition (1) for this case. To do so first note that, by definition
of ξˆ, we have
∑
t˜∈T ,c˜∈C ξˆ
t˜
c˜ =
∑
t˜∈T ,c˜∈C ξ
t˜
c˜. In addition, the relation
∑
t˜∈T ξ
t˜
c >
∑
t˜∈T ξ˜
t˜
c =∑
t˜∈T ξˆ
t˜
c and the assumption ξ ∈ Ξ imply that
∑
t˜∈T ξˆ
t˜
c ≤ qc. Likewise,
∑
t˜∈T ξˆ
t˜
c′ =
∑
t˜∈T ξ
t˜
c′+
1 ≤ ∑t˜∈T ξ˜ t˜c′ ≤ qc′ . Finally, for any c˜, t˜ with (c˜, t˜) 6∈ {(c, t), (c′, t′)}, we have ξˆ t˜c˜ = ξ t˜c˜ by
definition of ξˆ, so
∑
t˜∈T ξˆ
t˜
c˜ ≤ qc˜ for every c˜ 6= c, c′. Thus, ξˆ ∈ Ξ0.
Next, ξˆtc = ξtc − 1 ≥ ξ˜tc ≥ ptc (the first inequality follows from the assumption ξtc > ξ˜tc
and the second from ξ˜ ∈ Ξ), and ξˆtc = ξtc − 1 < ξtc ≤ qtc (the first inequality is obvious and
the second inequality follows from ξ ∈ Ξ). Moreover, ξˆt′c′ = ξt′c′ + 1 > ξt′c′ ≥ pt′c′ (the first
inequality is obvious and the second follows from ξ ∈ Ξ), and ξˆt′c′ = ξt′c′ + 1 ≤ ξ˜t′c′ ≤ qt′c′ (the
first inequality follows from ξt′c′ < ξ˜t
′
c′ and the second follows from ξ˜ ∈ Ξ). For any c˜, t˜ with
(c˜, t˜) 6∈ {(c, t), (c′, t′)}, we have ξˆ t˜c˜ = ξ t˜c˜ by definition of ξˆ, so pt˜c˜ ≤ ξˆ t˜c˜ ≤ qt˜c˜. Therefore, ξˆ ∈ Ξ
and hence we conclude (1).
The proof that (1) is satisfied follows from the facts that ξtc > ξ˜tc, ξ˜t
′
c′ > ξ
t′
c′ , there are more
students assigned to school c at ξ than ξ˜, and there are more students assigned to school c′
at ξ˜ than ξ. If we change the roles of ξ with ξ˜, c with c′, and t with t′, then (1) would imply
ξ¯ ∈ Ξ ∩ Ξ0. But this is exactly (2). Therefore, Ξ ∩ Ξ0 is an M-convex set.
The desired conclusion then follows from the fact that Ξ ∩ Ξ0 is an M-convex set and
Theorem 5. 
Proof of Corollary 3. We show that f is pseudo M-concave. Let ξ, ξ˜ ∈ Ξ0 be distinct.
Then U ≡ {(c, t)|ξct > ξ˜ct} is a nonempty set. Partition this set into three subsets:
U1 ≡ {(c, t)|ξˆct ≥ ξct > ξ˜ct}, U2 ≡ {(c, t)|ξct > ξˆct > ξ˜ct}, and U3 ≡ {(c, t)|ξct > ξ˜ct ≥ ξˆct}. Like-
wise V ≡ {(c′, t′)|ξ˜c′t′ > ξc′t′ } is a nonempty set that can be partitioned into three subsets:
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V1 ≡ {(c′, t′)|ξˆc′t′ ≥ ξ˜c′t′ > ξc′t′ }, V2 ≡ {(c′, t′)|ξ˜c′t′ > ξˆc′t′ > ξc′t′ }, and V3 ≡ {(c′, t′)|ξ˜c′t′ > ξc′t′ ≥ ξˆc′t′ }.
We consider several cases.
Case 1: U2 is nonempty. There exists (c, t) such that ξct > ξˆct > ξ˜ct . Since ξ, ξ˜ ∈ Ξ0, there
exists (c′, t′) such that ξc′t′ < ξ˜c
′
t′ . In this case, f(ξ−χc,t+χc′,t′) ≥ f(ξ) and f(ξ˜+χc,t−χc′,t′) ≥
f(ξ˜) by definition of f . Therefore,
min{f(ξ − χc,t + χc′,t′), f(ξ˜ + χc,t − χc′,t′)} ≥ min{f(ξ), f(ξ˜)}.
Case 2: V2 is nonempty. There exists (c′, t′) such that ξ˜c
′
t′ > ξˆ
c′
t′ > ξ
c′
t′ . The proof of this case
is similar to the proof of Case 1.
Case 3: U1 and V1 are nonempty. There exist (c, t) and (c′, t′) such that ξˆct ≥ ξct > ξ˜ct and
ξˆc
′
t′ ≥ ξ˜c′t′ > ξc′t′ . In this case, f(ξ − χc,t + χc′,t′) = f(ξ) and f(ξ˜ + χc,t − χc′,t′) = f(ξ˜) by
definition of f . Then,
min{f(ξ − χc,t + χc′,t′), f(ξ˜ + χc,t − χc′,t′)} = min{f(ξ), f(ξ˜)}.
Case 4: U3 and V3 are nonempty. There exist (c, t) and (c′, t′) such that ξct > ξ˜ct ≥ ξˆct and
ξ˜c
′
t′ > ξ
c′
t′ ≥ ξˆc′t′ . The proof is similar to the proof of Case 3.
Case 5: U = U1 and V = V3. For every (c, t) such that ξct > ξ˜ct , we have ξˆct ≥ ξct > ξ˜ct , and
for every (c′, t′) such that ξ˜c′t′ > ξc
′
t′ , we have ξ˜c
′
t′ > ξ
c′
t′ ≥ ξˆc′t′ . In this case, f(ξ˜) + 2 ≤ f(ξ),
so min{f(ξ˜), f(ξ)} = f(ξ˜). Furthermore, for any choice of (c, t) and (c′, t′) such that ξtc > ξ˜tc
and ξt′c′ < ξ˜t
′
c′ , we have f(ξ − χc,t + χc′,t′) = f(ξ)− 2 and f(ξ˜ + χc,t − χc′,t′) = f(ξ˜) + 2.
Since f(ξ)− 2 ≥ f(ξ˜) and f(ξ˜) + 2 > f(ξ˜), we get the desired conclusion that
min{f(ξ − χc,t + χc′,t′), f(ξ˜ + χc,t − χc′,t′)} ≥ f(ξ˜) = min{f(ξ), f(ξ˜)}.
Case 6: U = U3 and V = V1. For every (c, t) such that ξct > ξ˜ct , we have ξct > ξ˜ct ≥ ξˆct , and
for every (c′, t′) such that ξ˜c′t′ > ξc
′
t′ , we have ξˆc
′
t′ ≥ ξ˜c′t′ > ξc′t′ . The proof is similar to the proof
of Case 5.
We have considered all the possible cases: If U2 or V2 are nonempty, then we are done
by Cases 1 and 2, respectively. Suppose that they are both empty. Therefore, U = U1 ∪ U3
and V = V1 ∪ V3 are both nonempty. If U1 and V1 are nonempty, then we are done by Case
3. If U3 and V3 are nonempty, then we are done by Case 4. If U1 and V3 are nonempty and
one of U3 or V1 is nonempty, then we are done by Cases 3 or 4. Otherwise, if U3 and V1 are
empty when U1 and V3 are nonempty, then U = U1 and V = V3, which is covered by Case
5. If U3 and V1 are nonempty and one of U1 or V3 is nonempty, then we are done by Cases
3 or 4. Otherwise, if U1 and V3 are empty when U3 and V1 are nonempty, then U = U3 and
V = V1, which is covered by Case 6.
We conclude that f is pseudo M-concave since in all possible cases we derive the desired
inequality. Then the proof follows from Theorem 6. 
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Proof of Corollary 4. Let the balanced-exchange policy be denoted by Ξ. We first show that
Ξ ∩ Ξ0 is M-convex.
Suppose that there exist ξ, ξ˜ ∈ Ξ ∩ Ξ0 such that ξtc > ξ˜tc. To show M-convexity, we need
to find school c′ and type t′ with ξt′c′ < ξ˜t
′
c′ such that (1) ξˆ ≡ ξ − χc,t + χc′,t′ ∈ Ξ ∩ Ξ0 and (2)
ξ¯ ≡ ξ˜ + χc,t − χc′,t′ ∈ Ξ ∩ Ξ0.
If there exists t′ such that ξ˜t′c > ξt
′
c , then
∑
t˜∈T ξˆ
t˜
d =
∑
t˜∈T ξ¯
t˜
d =
∑
t˜∈T ξ
t˜
d = kd for every d
and
∑
t˜∈T ξˆ
t˜
c =
∑
t˜∈T ξ¯
t˜
c =
∑
t˜∈T ξ
t˜
c ≤ qc for every c ∈ C, so both (1) and (2) are satisfied.
Now suppose ξ˜t′c ≤ ξt′c for every type t′ 6= t. Therefore,
∑
t˜∈T ξ˜
t˜
c <
∑
t˜∈T ξ
t˜
c. Because∑
t˜∈T ,c˜:d(c˜)=d ξ˜
t˜
c˜ =
∑
t˜∈T ,c˜:d(c˜)=d ξ
t˜
c˜, where d ≡ d(c), there exists another school c′ in district d
such that
∑
t˜∈T ξ˜
t˜
c′ >
∑
t˜∈T ξ
t˜
c′ . In particular, there exists a type t′ such that ξ˜t
′
c′ > ξ
t′
c′ .
We first show (1). To do so, first note that since both schools c and c′ are in district
d,
∑
t˜∈T ,c˜:d(c˜)=d ξˆ
t˜
c˜ =
∑
t˜∈T ,c˜:d(c˜)=d ξ
t˜
c˜ = kd. Moreover, for any d˜ 6= d,
∑
t˜∈T ,c˜:d(c˜)=d˜ ξˆ
t˜
c˜ =∑
t˜∈T ,c˜:d(c˜)=d˜ ξ
t˜
c˜ = kd˜ because ξˆ t˜c˜ = ξ t˜c˜ for any t˜ and c˜ with d(c˜) = d˜ by definition of ξˆ. Thus,
ξˆ ∈ Ξ. Next we show ξˆ ∈ Ξ0. To do so, first observe that ∑t˜∈T ξ˜ t˜c = ∑t˜∈T ξ t˜c − 1 < qc.
Moreover,
∑
t˜∈T ξˆ
t˜
c′ =
∑
t˜∈T ξ
t˜
c′ + 1 ≤
∑
t˜∈T ξ˜
t˜
c′ ≤ qc′ . Furthermore, for any c˜ 6= c, c′,∑
t˜∈T ξˆ
t˜
c˜ =
∑
t˜∈T ξ
t˜
c˜ ≤ qc˜. Therefore, ξˆ ∈ Ξ0 and hence (1) holds.
Note that the above argument relies on the facts ξtc > ξ˜tc, ξt
′
c′ < ξ˜
t′
c′ , and d(c) = d(c′). If we
switch the roles of c with c′ and ξ with ξ˜, the implication of (1) is (2).
The result then follows from Theorem 5 because Ξ∩Ξ0 is M-convex and the initial match-
ing trivially satisfies the balanced-exchange policy. 
Proof of Corollary 5. The proof is very similar to those of Corollary 2 and Corollary 4.
We first show that Ξ ∩ Ξ0 is an M-convex set. Recall that Ξ = {ξ|∀c, t qtc ≥ ξtc ≥
ptc and ∀d
∑
t ξ
t
d = kd} and Ξ0 = {ξ|
∑
c,t ξ
t
c =
∑
d kd and ∀c qc ≥
∑
t ξ
t
c}.
Suppose that there exist ξ, ξ˜ ∈ Ξ ∩ Ξ0 such that ξtc > ξ˜tc. To show M-convexity, we need
to find school c′ and type t′ with ξt′c′ < ξ˜t
′
c′ such that (1) ξˆ ≡ ξ − χc,t + χc′,t′ ∈ Ξ ∩ Ξ0 and (2)
ξ¯ ≡ ξ˜+χc,t−χc′,t′ ∈ Ξ∩Ξ0. Let d ≡ d(c). To show both conditions, we look at two possible
cases depending on whether c′ = c or not.
Case 1: First consider the case in which there exists type t′ such that ξt′c < ξ˜t
′
c . We prove
(1) for c′ = c. First, by definition of ξˆ, we have
∑
t˜∈T ,c˜∈C ξˆ
t˜
c˜ =
∑
t˜∈T ,c˜∈C ξ
t˜
c˜ =
∑
d kd. Next,
since
∑
t˜∈T ξˆ
t˜
c =
∑
t˜∈T ξ
t˜
c, we have
∑
t˜∈T ξˆ
t˜
c ≤ qc. Therefore, ξˆ ∈ Ξ0.
Next, we have ξˆtc = ξtc − 1 ≥ ξ˜tc ≥ ptc (the equality comes from the definition of ξˆ, the
first inequality comes from the assumption ξtc > ξ˜tc, and the second inequality comes from
the assumption ξ˜ ∈ Ξ), and ξˆtc = ξtc − 1 < ξtc ≤ qtc (the equality comes from the definition
of ξˆ, the first inequality is obvious, and the second inequality comes from the assumption
ξ ∈ Ξ). Moreover, we have ξˆt′c = ξt′c + 1 > ξt′c ≥ pt′c (the equality comes from the definition
of ξˆ, the first inequality is obvious, and the second inequality comes from the assumption
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ξ ∈ Ξ), and ξˆt′c = ξt′c + 1 ≤ ξ˜t′c ≤ qt′c (the equality comes from the definition of ξˆ, the first
inequality comes from the assumption ξt′c < ξ˜t
′
c , and the second inequality comes from the
assumption ξ˜ ∈ Ξ). For any c˜, t˜ with (c˜, t˜) 6∈ {(c, t), (c, t′)}, we have ξˆ t˜c˜ = ξ t˜c˜ by definition of
ξˆ, so pt˜c˜ ≤ ξˆ t˜c˜ ≤ qt˜c˜. Finally,
∑
t˜∈T ξˆ
t˜
d =
∑
t˜∈T ξ¯
t˜
d =
∑
t˜∈T ξ
t˜
d = kd for every d. Therefore, ξˆ ∈ Ξ
and hence we conclude (1).
The proof that (1) is satisfied follows from the facts that ξtc > ξ˜tc and ξt
′
c < ξ˜
t′
c . By changing
the roles of t with t′ and ξ with ξ˜ in the preceding argument, we get the implication of (1)
that ξ¯ ∈ Ξ ∩ Ξ0. But this is exactly (2).
Case 2: Second, consider the case in which there exists no type t′ such that ξt′c < ξ˜t
′
c .
Then, ξt′c ≥ ξ˜t′c for every t′ 6= t. This in particular implies
∑
t˜∈T ξ
t˜
c >
∑
t˜∈T ξ˜
t˜
c. Because∑
t˜∈T ,c˜:d(c˜)=d ξ˜
t˜
c˜ =
∑
t˜∈T ,c˜:d(c˜)=d ξ
t˜
c˜, where d ≡ d(c), there exists another school c′ in district d
such that
∑
t˜∈T ξ˜
t˜
c′ >
∑
t˜∈T ξ
t˜
c′ . In particular, there exists a type t′ such that ξ˜t
′
c′ > ξ
t′
c′ .
Now we proceed to show condition (1) for this case. To do so first note that, by definition
of ξˆ, we have
∑
t˜∈T ,c˜∈C ξˆ
t˜
c˜ =
∑
t˜∈T ,c˜∈C ξ
t˜
c˜. In addition, the relation
∑
t˜∈T ξ
t˜
c >
∑
t˜∈T ξ˜
t˜
c =∑
t˜∈T ξˆ
t˜
c and the assumption ξ ∈ Ξ imply that
∑
t˜∈T ξˆ
t˜
c ≤ qc. Likewise,
∑
t˜∈T ξˆ
t˜
c′ =
∑
t˜∈T ξ
t˜
c′+
1 ≤ ∑t˜∈T ξ˜ t˜c′ ≤ qc′ . Finally, for any c˜, t˜ with (c˜, t˜) 6∈ {(c, t), (c′, t′)}, we have ξˆ t˜c˜ = ξ t˜c˜ by
definition of ξˆ, so
∑
t˜∈T ξˆ
t˜
c˜ ≤ qc˜ for every c˜ 6= c, c′. Thus, ξˆ ∈ Ξ0.
Next, ξˆtc = ξtc − 1 ≥ ξ˜tc ≥ ptc (the first inequality follows from the assumption ξtc > ξ˜tc
and the second from ξ˜ ∈ Ξ), and ξˆtc = ξtc − 1 < ξtc ≤ qtc (the first inequality is obvious and
the second inequality follows from ξ ∈ Ξ). Moreover, ξˆt′c′ = ξt′c′ + 1 > ξt′c′ ≥ pt′c′ (the first
inequality is obvious and the second follows from ξ ∈ Ξ), and ξˆt′c′ = ξt′c′ + 1 ≤ ξ˜t′c′ ≤ qt′c′
(the first inequality follows from ξt′c′ < ξ˜t
′
c′ and the second follows from ξ˜ ∈ Ξ). For any
c˜, t˜ with (c˜, t˜) 6∈ {(c, t), (c′, t′)}, we have ξˆ t˜c˜ = ξ t˜c˜ by definition of ξˆ, so pt˜c˜ ≤ ξˆ t˜c˜ ≤ qt˜c˜. Next,
note that since both schools c and c′ are in district d,
∑
t˜∈T ,c˜:d(c˜)=d ξˆ
t˜
c˜ =
∑
t˜∈T ,c˜:d(c˜)=d ξ
t˜
c˜ = kd.
Moreover, for any d˜ 6= d, ∑t˜∈T ,c˜:d(c˜)=d˜ ξˆ t˜c˜ = ∑t˜∈T ,c˜:d(c˜)=d˜ ξ t˜c˜ = kd˜ because ξˆ t˜c˜ = ξ t˜c˜ for any t˜
and c˜ with d(c˜) = d˜ by definition of ξˆ. Therefore, ξˆ ∈ Ξ and hence we conclude (1).
The proof that (1) is satisfied follows from the facts that ξtc > ξ˜tc, ξ˜t
′
c′ > ξ
t′
c′ , there are more
students assigned to school c at ξ than ξ˜, and there are more students assigned to school c′
at ξ˜ than ξ. If we change the roles of ξ with ξ˜, c with c′, and t with t′, then (1) would imply
ξ¯ ∈ Ξ ∩ Ξ0. But this is exactly (2). Therefore, Ξ ∩ Ξ0 is an M-convex set.
The result then follows from Theorem 5 because Ξ ∩ Ξ0 is M-convex. 
Proof of Theorem 8. Suppose that district admissions rules favor own students. Fix a stu-
dent preference profile. Recall that under interdistrict school choice, students are as-
signed to schools by SPDA, where each student ranks all contracts associated with her
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and each district d has the admissions rule Chd. Under intradistrict school choice, stu-
dents are assigned to schools by SPDA where students only rank the contracts asso-
ciated with their home districts and each district d has the admissions rule Chd. We
first show that the intradistrict SPDA outcome can be produced by SPDA when all dis-
tricts participate simultaneously and students rank all contracts, including the ones as-
sociated with the other districts, by modifying admissions rules for the districts. Let
Ch′d(X) ≡ Chd({x ∈ X|d(s(x)) = d}) be the modified admissions rule.
In SPDA, if district admissions rules have completions that satisfy path independence,
then SPDA outcomes are the same under the completions and the original admissions
rules because in SPDA a district always considers a set of proposals which is feasible for
students. Furthermore, SPDA does not depend on the order of proposals when district
admissions rules are path independent. As a result, SPDA does not depend on the order
of proposals when district admissions rules have completions that satisfy path indepen-
dence. Therefore, the intradistrict SPDA outcome can be produced by SPDA when all
districts participate simultaneously and students rank all contracts including the ones as-
sociated with the other districts and each district dhas the admissions ruleCh′d. The reason
behind this is that when each district d has admissions rule Ch′d, a student is not admitted
to a school district other than her home district. Furthermore, because Chd favors own
students, the set of chosen students under Ch′d is the same as that under Chd for any set
of contracts of the form {x ∈ X|d(s(x)) = d} for any set X .
We next show that Ch′d has a path-independent completion. By assumption, for every
district d, there exists a path-independent completion C˜hd ofChd. Let C˜h
′
d(X) ≡ C˜hd({x ∈
X|d(s(x)) = d}). We show that C˜h′d is a path-independent completion of Ch′d. To show
that C˜h
′
d(X) is a completion, consider a set X such that C˜h
′
d(X) is feasible for students.
Let X∗ ≡ {x ∈ X|d(s(x)) = d}. Then we have the following:
C˜h
′
d(X
∗) = C˜hd(X∗) = Chd(X∗) = Ch′d(X
∗),
where the first equality follows from the definition of C˜h
′
d, the second equality follows
from the fact that C˜hd is a completion of Chd, and the third equality follows from the
definition of Ch′d. Furthermore, because C˜h
′
d(X) = C˜h
′
d(X
∗) and Ch′d(X∗) = Ch′d(X), we
get C˜h
′
d(X) = Ch
′
d(X). Therefore, C˜h
′
d is a completion of Ch′d.
To show that C˜h
′
d is path independent, consider two sets of contracts X and Y . Let
X∗ ≡ {x ∈ X|d(s(x)) = d} and Y ∗ ≡ {x ∈ Y |d(s(x)) = d}. Then we have the following:
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C˜h
′
d(X ∪ C˜h
′
d(Y )) = C˜h
′
d(X ∪ C˜hd(Y ∗))
= C˜hd(X
∗ ∪ C˜hd(Y ∗))
= C˜hd(X
∗ ∪ Y ∗)
= C˜h
′
d(X ∪ Y ),
where the first and second equalities follow from the definition of C˜h
′
d, the third equality
follows from path independence of C˜hd, and the last equality follows from the definition
of C˜h
′
d. Therefore, C˜h
′
d is path independent.
BecauseChd favors own students, we haveChd(X) ⊇ Ch′d(X) for everyX that is feasible
for students. Furthermore, for any such X , C˜hd(X) = Chd(X) and C˜h
′
d(X) = Ch
′
d(X)
because C˜hd is a completion ofChd and C˜h
′
d is a completion ofCh′d, respectively. Therefore,
for any X that is feasible for students, C˜hd(X) ⊇ C˜h
′
d(X). We use this result to show the
following lemma.
Lemma 5. Every student weakly prefers the interdistrict SPDA outcome under (C˜hd)d∈D to the
interdistrict SPDA outcome under (C˜h
′
d)d∈D.
Proof. Let µ be the interdistrict SPDA outcome under (C˜hd)d∈D and µ′ be the interdistrict
SPDA outcome under (C˜h
′
d)d∈D. If µ′ is stable under (C˜hd)d∈D, then the conclusion follows
from the result that µ is the student-optimal stable matching under (C˜hd)d∈D because each
C˜hd is path independent (Chambers and Yenmez, 2017).
Suppose that µ′ is not stable under (C˜hd)d∈D. Since µ′ is stable under (C˜h
′
d)d∈D,
C˜h
′
d(µ
′
d) = µ
′
d for every district d. Furthermore, µ′d is feasible for students, so C˜hd(µ′d) ⊇
C˜h
′
d(µ
′
d) = µ
′
d. By definition of admissions rules, µ′d ⊇ C˜hd(µ′d), so C˜hd(µ′d) = µ′d. As
a result, there must exist a blocking contract for matching µ′ so that it is not stable un-
der (C˜hd)d∈D. Whenever there exists a blocking pair, we consider the following algorithm
to improve student welfare. Let d1 be a district associated with a blocking contract. Set
µ0 ≡ µ′.
Step n (n ≥ 1): Consider the following set of contracts associated with a district dn
for which there exists an associated blocking contract: Xndn ≡ {x = (s, dn, c)|x Ps
µn−1s }. District dn accepts C˜hdn(µn−1d ∪ Xndn) and rejects the rest of the contracts.
Let µndn ≡ C˜hdn(µn−1dn ∪ Xndn) and µnd ≡ µn−1d \ Y n where Y n ≡ {x ∈ µn−1|∃y ∈
µndn s.t. s(x) = s(y)} for d 6= dn. If there are no blocking contracts for matching µn
under (C˜hd)d∈D, then stop and return µn, otherwise go to Step n+ 1.
We show that district dn does not reject any contract in µn−1dn by mathematical induction
on n, i.e., µndn ⊇ µn−1dn for every n ≥ 1. Consider the base case for n = 1. Recall that µ1d1 =
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C˜hd1(µ
0
d1
∪X1d1) = C˜hd1(µ′d1 ∪X1d1). By construction, µ1d1 is a feasible matching. We claim
that µ′d1 ∪ µ1d1 is feasible for students. Suppose, for contradiction, that it is not feasible for
students. Then there exists a student swho has one contract in µ′d1 and one in µ
1
d1
\µ′d1 . Call
the latter contract z. By construction, z Ps µ′s, and by path independence, z ∈ C˜hd1(µ′d1 ∪
{z}). Furthermore, since student s is matched with district d1 in µ′, d(s) = d1. Therefore,
C˜hd1(µ
′
d1
∪ {z}) = C˜h′d1(µ′d1 ∪ {z}) by definition of C˜h
′
d1
and construction of µ′. Hence,
z ∈ C˜h′d1(µ′d1 ∪ {z}), which contradicts the fact that µ′ is stable under (C˜h
′
d)d∈D. Hence,
µ′d1 ∪ µ1d1 is feasible for students. Feasibility for students implies that C˜hd1(µ′d1 ∪ µ1d1) ⊇
C˜h
′
d1
(µ′d1 ∪ µ1d1). Path independence and construction of µ1d1 yield µ1d1 = C˜hd1(µ′d1 ∪ µ1d1).
Furthermore, there exists no student s, such that d(s) = d1 ,who has a contract in µ1d1 \ µ′,
as this would contradict stability of µ′ under (C˜h
′
d)d∈D. This implies, by definition of C˜h
′
d1
,
that C˜h
′
d1
(µ′d1 ∪ µ1d1) = C˜h
′
d1
(µ′d1), and, by stability of µ
′ under (C˜h
′
d)d∈D, C˜h
′
d1
(µ′d1) = µ
′
d1
.
Therefore, µ1d1 = C˜hd1(µ
′
d1
∪ µ1d1) ⊇ C˜h
′
d1
(µ′d1 ∪ µ1d1) = µ′d1 = µ0d1 , which means that district
d1 does not reject any contracts.
Now consider district dn where n > 1. There are two cases to consider. First consider
the case when dn 6= di for every i < n. In this case, µn−1dn ⊆ µ0dn = µ′dn . We repeat
the same arguments as in the previous paragraph. Stability of µ′ under (C˜h
′
d)d∈D and
path independence of C˜h
′
dn implies that µ
n
dn
∪ µn−1dn is feasible for students. Therefore,
C˜hdn(µ
n−1
dn
∪ µndn) ⊇ C˜h
′
dn(µ
n−1
dn
∪ µndn). Furthermore, there exists no student s, such that
d(s) = dn, who has a contract in µndn \ µn−1dn . As a result, by definition of C˜h
′
dn and by path
independence, C˜h
′
dn(µ
n−1
dn
∪ µndn) = C˜h
′
dn(µ
n−1
dn
) = µn−1dn . As in the previous paragraph, we
conclude that µndn = C˜hdn(µ
n−1
dn
∪ µndn) ⊇ C˜h
′
dn(µ
n−1
dn
∪ µndn) = µn−1dn .
The second case is when there exists i < n such that di = dn. Let i∗ be the last such
step before n. Since student welfare improves at every step before n by the mathematical
induction hypothesis, µi∗−1dn ∪ X i
∗
dn
⊇ µn−1dn ∪ Xndn . By definition, µi
∗
dn
= C˜hdn(µ
i∗−1
dn
∪ X i∗dn),
which implies by path independence that µn−1dn ⊆ C˜hdn(µn−1dn ∪Xndn) = µndn since µn−1dn ⊆ µi
∗
dn
.
Finally, we need to show that the improvement algorithm terminates. We claim that
µndn 6= µn−1dn . Suppose, for contradiction, that these two matchings are the same. Then,
by path independence of C˜hdn , for every x ∈ Xndn , C˜hdn(µn−1dn ∪ {x}) = µn−1dn . This is a
contradiction because there exists at least one blocking contract associated with district dn.
Therefore, district dn gets at least one new contract at Step n. Hence, at least one student
gets a strictly more preferred contract at every step of the algorithm while every other
student gets a weakly more preferred contract. Since the number of contracts is finite, the
algorithm has to end in a finite number of steps.

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Because the interdistrict SPDA outcome under (Chd)d∈D is the same as the interdistrict
SPDA outcome under (C˜hd)d∈D and the interdistrict SPDA outcome under (Ch′d)d∈D is the
same as the interdistrict SPDA outcome under (C˜h
′
)d∈D, the lemma implies that every stu-
dent weakly prefers the outcome of interdistrict SPDA under (Chd)d∈D to the outcome of
intradistrict SPDA (which is the same as the interdistrict SPDA outcome under (Ch′d)d∈D).
This completes the proof of the first part.
To prove the second part of the theorem, we show that if at least one district’s admissions
rule fails to favor own students, then there exists a student preference profile such that not
every student is weakly better off under interdistrict SPDA than under intradistrict SPDA.
Suppose that for some district d, there exists a matching X , which is feasible for students,
such that Chd(X) is not a superset of Chd(X∗), where X∗ ≡ {x ∈ X|d(s(x)) = d}. Now,
consider a matching Y where (i) all students from district d are matched with schools in
district d, (ii) Y is feasible, and (iii) Y ⊇ Chd(X∗). The existence of such a Y follows from
the fact that Chd(X∗) is feasible and kd′ ≤
∑
c:d(c)=d′ qc, for every district d′ (that is, there
are enough seats in district d′ to match all students from district d′.) Because Y is feasible
and Chd is acceptant, Chd(Yd) = Yd.
Now consider the following student preferences. First we consider students from dis-
trict d. Each student swho has a contract inX∗ ranksX∗s as her top choice. Note that doing
so is well defined becauseX∗ is feasible for students. Each student swho has a contract in
X∗ \Chd(X∗) ranks contract Ys as her second top choice. Note that, in this case, Ys cannot
be the same asX∗s becauseChd(Yd) = Yd andChd is path independent. Each student swho
has a contract in Y \X∗ ranks that contract as her top choice. Next we consider students
from the other districts. Each student s who has a contract in X \ X∗ ranks that contract
as her top choice. Any other student ranks a contract not associated with district d as her
top choice. Complete the rest of the student preferences arbitrarily.
Consider SPDA for district d in intradistrict school choice. At the first step, students who
have a contract in X∗ propose that contract. The remaining students who have contracts
in Y \X∗ propose the associated contracts. Because Y is feasible, Y contains Chd(X∗), and
Chd is acceptant, only contracts in X∗ \ Chd(X∗) are rejected. At the second step, these
students propose their contracts in Yd, and the set of proposals that the district considers
is Yd. Because Chd(Yd) = Yd, no contract is rejected, and SPDA stops and returns Yd. In
particular, every student who has a contract in Chd(X∗) has the corresponding contract at
the outcome.
In interdistrict SPDA, at the first step, each student who has a contract inX proposes that
contract and every other student proposes a contract associated with a district different
from d. District d considersX (orXd), and tentatively accepts Chd(X). Because Chd(X) 6⊇
Chd(X
∗) by assumption, at least one student who has a contract in Chd(X∗) is rejected.
60 HAFALIR, KOJIMA, AND YENMEZ
Therefore, this student is strictly worse off under interdistrict school choice than under
intradistrict school choice. 
Proof of Theorem 9. To show the result, we first introduce the following weakening of the
substitutability condition (Hatfield and Kojima, 2008). A district admissions rule Chd sat-
isfies weak substitutability if, for every x ∈ X ⊆ Y ⊆ X with x ∈ Chd(Y ) and |Ys| ≤ 1 for
each s ∈ S, it must be that x ∈ Chd(X).
Under weak substitutability, the following result is known (the statement is slightly
modified for the present setting).
Theorem 10 (Hatfield and Kojima (2008)). Let d and d′ be two distinct districts. Suppose that
Chd satisfies IRC but violates weak substitutability. Then, there exist student preferences and
a path-independent admissions rule for d′ such that, regardless of the other districts’ admissions
rules, no stable matching exists.
Given this result, for our purposes it suffices to show the following.
Theorem 9’. Let d be a district. There exist a set of students, their types, schools in d, and type-
specific ceilings for d such that there is no district admissions rule of d that has district-level type-
specific ceilings, is d-weakly acceptant, and satisfies IRC and weak substitutability.
To show this result, consider a district d with kd = 2. There are three schools c1, c2, c3 in
the district, each with capacity one, and four students s1, s2, s3, s4 of which two are from
a different district. Students s1 and s2 are of type t1 and students s3 and s4 are of type t2.
The district-level type-specific ceilings are as follows: qt1d = q
t2
d = 1.
Suppose, for contradiction, that the district admissions rule has district-level type-
specific ceilings, is d-weakly acceptant, and satisfies IRC and weak substitutability.
Consider Chd({(s1, c1), (s2, c1), (s3, c1), (s4, c1)}). Since types are symmetric and two
students are symmetric within each type, without loss of generality, we can assume
Chd({(s1, c1), (s2, c1), (s3, c1), (s4, c1)}) = {(s1, c1)} because qc1 = 1.
Next, consider Chd({(s2, c2), (s3, c2), (s4, c2)}). Because qc2 = 1 and Chd is d-weakly ac-
ceptant, this is either equal to {(s2, c2)} or {(s3, c2)} (the case when it is equal to {(s4, c2)}
is symmetric to the case when {(s3, c2)}. We analyze these two cases separately.
(1) Suppose Chd({(s2, c2), (s3, c2), (s4, c2)}) = {(s2, c2)}. Then, by IRC, we
conclude that Chd({(s2, c2), (s3, c2)}) = {(s2, c2)}. Next, we argue that
Chd({(s1, c1), (s2, c2), (s3, c2)}) = {(s2, c2)}. This is because the only two
cases that satisfy d-weak acceptance and type-specific ceilings are {(s2, c2)} and
{(s1, c1), (s3, c2)}. The latter would violate weak substitutability since in that case
(s3, c2) would be accepted in a larger set {(s1, c1), (s2, c2), (s3, c2)} and rejected from
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a smaller set {(s2, c2), (s3, c2)}. Then, by IRC, Chd({(s1, c1), (s2, c2), (s3, c2)}) =
{(s2, c2)} implies Chd({(s1, c1), (s2, c2)}) = {(s2, c2)}. Then we note that
Chd({(s1, c1), (s2, c2), (s3, c1)}) = {(s2, c2), (s3, c1)} since by weak substitutabil-
ity (s1, c1) cannot be chosen, and therefore (s2, c2) and (s3, c1) have to be
chosen due to d-weak acceptance. Next, again by weak substitutabil-
ity, we note that Chd({(s1, c1), (s2, c2), (s3, c1)}) = {(s2, c2), (s3, c1)} implies
Chd({(s1, c1), (s3, c1)}) = {(s3, c1)}. Finally, we note that this contradicts
Chd({(s1, c1), (s2, c1), (s3, c1), (s4, c1)}) = {(s1, c1)} and IRC.
(2) Suppose Chd({(s2, c2), (s3, c2), (s4, c2)}) = {(s3, c2)}. Consider
Chd({(s2, c3), (s4, c3)}). Because qc3 = 1 and Chd is d-weakly acceptant, this
is either {(s2, c3)} or {(s4, c3)}. We consider these two possible cases separately.
These two subcases will follow similar arguments to Case (1) above and change
the indices appropriately in order to get a contradiction.
(a) Suppose Chd({(s2, c3), (s4, c3)}) = {(s2, c3)}. Next, we argue that
Chd({(s1, c1), (s2, c3), (s4, c3)}) = {(s2, c3)}. This is because the only two
cases that satisfy d-weak acceptance and type-specific ceilings are {(s2, c3)}
and {(s1, c1), (s4, c3)}. The latter would violate weak substitutability since in
that case (s4, c3) would be accepted in a larger set {(s1, c1), (s2, c3), (s4, c3)}
and rejected from a smaller set {(s2, c3), (s4, c3)}. Then, by IRC,
Chd({(s1, c1), (s2, c3), (s4, c3)}) = {(s2, c3)} implies Chd({(s1, c1), (s2, c3)}) =
{(s2, c3)}. Then we note that Chd({(s1, c1), (s2, c3), (s4, c1)}) = {(s2, c3), (s4, c1)}
since by weak substitutability (s1, c1) cannot to be chosen, therefore (s2, c3)
and (s4, c1) have to be chosen due to d-weak acceptance. Next, again by weak
substitutability, we note thatChd({(s1, c1), (s2, c3), (s4, c1)}) = {(s2, c3), (s4, c1)}
implies Chd({(s1, c1), (s4, c1)}) = {(s4, c1)}. Finally, we note that this contra-
dicts Chd({(s1, c1), (s2, c1), (s3, c1), (s4, c1)}) = {(s1, c1)} and IRC.
(b) Suppose Chd({(s2, c3), (s4, c3)}) = {(s4, c3)}. Next, we argue that
Chd({(s2, c3), (s3, c2), (s4, c3)}) = {(s4, c3)}. This is because the only two
cases that satisfy d-weak acceptance and type-specific ceilings are {(s4, c3)}
and {(s2, c3), (s3, c2)}. The latter would violate weak substitutability since in
that case (s2, c3) would be accepted in a larger set {(s2, c3), (s3, c2), (s4, c3)}
and rejected from a smaller set {(s2, c3), (s4, c3)}. Then, by IRC,
Chd({(s2, c3), (s3, c2), (s4, c3)}) = {(s4, c3)} implies Chd({(s3, c2), (s4, c3)}) =
{(s4, c3)}. Then we note that Chd({(s2, c2), (s3, c2), (s4, c3)}) = {(s2, c2), (s4, c3)}
since by weak substitutability (s3, c2) cannot to be chosen, therefore (s4, c3)
and (s2, c2) have to be chosen due to d-weak acceptance. Next, again by weak
substitutability, we note thatChd({(s2, c2), (s3, c2), (s4, c3)}) = {(s2, c2), (s4, c3)}
62 HAFALIR, KOJIMA, AND YENMEZ
implies Chd({(s2, c2), (s3, c2)}) = {(s2, c2)}. Finally, we note that this contra-
dicts Chd({(s2, c2), (s3, c2), (s4, c2)}) = {(s3, c2)} and IRC.

